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The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the 





 Subrogation exists in the law as a mechanism for insurers to recover the 
costs of reimbursing injured insured parties. The right of subrogation is ex-
tremely important to insurers. The inclusion of provisions recognizing the 
right of insurance companies to seek subrogation or reimbursement for pay-
ments made in the event of a loss are the norm for almost every type of insur-
ance contract. It is not uncommon for insurers to include both subrogation 
and reimbursement provisions in a policy. Consequently, every insurance 
company has established within its claims process a procedure for enforcing 
its interest in being repaid through both subrogation and reimbursement. 
Application of the doctrine of subrogation often occurs at the expense of 
the insured. As a result, the common law developed the made whole doctrine, 
which limits the use of subrogation prior to an insured party receiving full 
compensation for damages. The primary purpose of this article is to explore 
the made whole doctrine as the principal weapon used by contemporary 
courts to curb the harsh effect of contractual subrogation on the rights of the 
insured. Section I of this article provides an overview of the expansion and 
use of subrogation in various types of insurance contracts. Section II exam-
ines the made whole doctrine, which has been utilized by modern courts to 
reign in the impact of subrogation on insured parties. This section identifies 
each jurisdiction that has adopted the doctrine and documents the circum-
stances and conditions required for its application on a state-by-state basis. 
While section II provides a comprehensive discussion of the made whole rule 
in the context of legal and conventional subrogation, a detailed discussion of 
the doctrine with regards to statutory subrogation on a state-by-state, statute-
by-statute basis, is beyond the scope of this article. Section III attempts to 
catalog the various forms of the made whole doctrine and to identify the 
characteristics common to the respective forms. This section also associates 
each form with the jurisdictions that follow it.  
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBROGATION 
Subrogation is a creature of equity.
1
 It is variously defined as the substi-
tution of an insurer to the rights of its insured and as a normal incident of 
indemnity.
2
 As such, upon payment of its insured’s claim, the insurer steps 
into the shoes of the insured and acquires all of the rights the insured may 
have against a third party.
3
 Because an insurer’s right of subrogation is purely 
derivative,
4
 a subrogating insurer inherits no greater rights against the tortfea-
sor than those possessed by the insured and is subject to the same defenses 
assertable against the insured.
5
 Furthermore, the party asserting subrogation 
  
 1. “The right of subrogation must be founded upon an equity just and reason-
able according to general principles--an equity that will accomplish complete justice 
between the parties to the controversy. The one asserting the right cannot thereby 
profit from his own wrong; he must, himself, be without fault.” Standard Accident 
Ins. Co. v Pellecchia, 104 A.2d 288, 293 (N.J. 1954); see also Wimberly v. Am. Cas. 
Co., 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979).  
The doctrine of subrogation in insurance does not arise from, nor is it de-
pendent upon, statute or custom or any of the terms of the contract; it has 
its origin in general principles of equity and in the nature of the insurance 
contract as one of indemnity. The right of subrogation rests not upon a 
contract, but upon the principles of natural justice.  
Wimberly, 584 S.W.2d at 203 (quotation omitted). 
 2. The purpose of insurance is to “pay back” or “indemnify” policyholders for 
what they have lost, or in other words, to restore the insured as far as practical to its 
pre-loss condition. The indemnity principle is one of the two primary rationales for 
subrogation. Unless the insurer is allowed subrogation from the tortfeasor the insured 
could potentially obtain double recovery by collecting the insurance proceeds for the 
loss and successfully suing the tortfeasor over the same loss. See, e.g., Dix Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. LaFramboise, 597 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ill. 1992); Kozlowski v. Briggs Leasing 
Corp., 408 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1004 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1978); Castleman Constr. Co. v. 
Pennington, 432 S.W.2d 669, 674-75 (Tenn. 1968). 
 3. See, e.g., LaFramboise, 597 N.E.2d 622; Amert v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 409 
N.W.2d 660, 663 (S.D. 1987). 
 4. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 77 Cal Rptr. 2d 296, 303 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998); Landrum v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 527 S.E.2d 637, 638 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2000); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heiken, 675 N.W.2d 820, 826 (Iowa 2004); 
Burke v. Schroth, 601 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Hermeling v. Minn. 
Fire & Cas. Co., 534 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), aff’d, 548 N.W.2d 370 
(Minn. 1996), overruled on other grounds, Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 
401, 404 (Minn. 2000); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Glassing, 887 P.2d 218, 
220 (Mont. 1994); Motor Club Ins. Ass’n. v. Fillman, 568 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 1997); USF&G v. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp., 37 P.3d 828, 831 (Okla. 
2001). 
 5. This process is described in the case law as that of “stepping into the shoes of 
the insured.” See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 843 So. 2d 140 (Ala. 
2002); Hartford Ins. Co., v. Mullinax, 984 S.W.2d 821 (Ark. 1999); Fireman’s Fund 
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bears the burden of proving the existence of the right.
6
 In the case of legal 
subrogation this entails demonstrating: (1) the existence of a debt or obliga-
tion for which a party, other than the subrogee, is primarily liable, which (2) 
the subrogee, who is neither a volunteer nor an intermeddler, pays or dis-
charges in order to protect his own rights and interest.
7
 The proof requirement 




Subrogation effectuates an equitable adjustment between parties by pre-
venting unjust enrichment and furthering the principle of indemnity
9
 in two 
  
Ins. Co., 77 Cal Rptr. 2d at 303; Landrum, 527 S.E.2d at 638; Hermeling, 534 
N.W.2d at 718; Glassing, 887 P.2d at 221; Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 
Carter, Reister & Assoc., Inc., 546 P.2d 72, 74 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); Fed. Ins. Co. v. 
Arthur Anderson & Co., 552 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1990). 
 6. See Knight v. Alefosio, 205 Cal. Rptr. 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); First Ins. Co. 
of Hawaii, Ltd. v. Jackson, 681 P.2d 569, 571 (Haw. 1984); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 539 A.2d 239, 245 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); 
Wolters v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 827 A.2d 197, 200 (N.H. 2003); Nationwide Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gamelin, 786 A.2d 1078, 1084 (Vt. 2001); Yun v. Papp, 1997 WL 
811837, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). 
 7. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Edmar Constr. Co., 294 A.2d 865, 869 (D.C. 
1972); Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 242 A.2d 482, 485 (Md. 1968); Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 539 A.2d 239 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 869 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. App. 1993); 
Livingston v. Shelton, 537 P.2d 774, 776 (Wash. 1975) (en banc); but see Gulf Ins. 
Co.v. TIG Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001): 
An insurer’s cause of action for equitable subrogation contains six ele-
ments: (1) the insured has suffered a loss for which the party to be charged 
is liable; (2) the insurer has compensated for the loss; (3) the insured has 
existing, assignable causes of action against the party to be charged, 
which the insured could have pursued had the insurer not compensated the 
loss; (4) the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or omission 
which triggers the liability of the party to be charged; (5) justice requires 
that the loss be shifted entirely from the insurer to the party to be charged; 
and (6) the insurer’s damages are in a stated sum, which is usually the 
amount paid to the insured, assuming the payment was not voluntary and 
was reasonable.  
Id. at 312. See also Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 547 So. 2d 1339, 
1347 (La. Ct. App. 1989).  
Some jurisdictions express the requirements for equitable subrogation in terms of four 
elements. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW, § 96[b] (2d ed. 
1996) (citing Hampton Loan & Exch. Bank v. Lightsey, 152 S.E. 425 (S.C. 1930)). 
 8. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pac. Rent-All, 978 P.2d 753 (Haw. 1999); 
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Trail, 459 So. 2d 1368 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Mangan, 242 A.2d 
482; Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. MacGregor, 368 N.E.2d 1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). 
 9. Almost all types of insurance are designed to provide no more than reim-
bursement for an insured. Moreover, it is now a generally accepted fundamental tenet 
of insurance law that opportunities for net gain to an insured through the receipt of 
insurance proceeds exceeding a loss is inimical to the public interest. In other words, 
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ways. First, it compels payment of a debt by one who in equity ought to 
pay,
10
 i.e. the tortfeasor. Second, it achieves these objectives in the context of 
the insured by precluding an insured from recovering twice for the same 
loss.
11
 Subrogation allows the insurer to be substituted to the rights of the 
insured and seek recovery for its payment to the insured directly from the 
third party responsible for the loss, or when the insured has recovered from 
the third party, to be reimbursed from that recovery.
12
 
There are three types of subrogation B legal, conventional and statu-
tory.
13
 Legal subrogation, also known as equitable or judicial subrogation, 
arises by operation of law.
14
 Conventional or contractual subrogation arises 
out of a contractual agreement between the insured and insurer.
15
 The agree-
ment can take many forms, such as a subrogation provision in the policy or a 
release agreement, assignment or trust agreement. Statutory subrogation is a 
creature of the legislature and arises from a legislative enactment which vests 
  
insurance arrangements are structured to provide funds to offset a loss either wholly 
or partly, and the payments made by an insurer generally are limited to an amount that 
does not exceed what is required to restore the insured to a condition relatively 
equivalent to that which existed before the loss occurred. The concept that insurance 
contracts shall confer a benefit no greater in value than the loss suffered by an insured 
is generally referred to as the “principle of indemnity.” R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, 
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 3.1(a) (Student ed. 1988). 
Another rationale for subrogation is that it provides restitution to the insurer for pay-
ments made. See CHARLES MITCHELL, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION 8-15 (1994). 
 10. See, e.g., Dix Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaFramboise, 597 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ill. 1992); 
Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1983); Wolters, 827 A.2d at 
199-200; Amert v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 409 N.W.2d 660, 663 (S.D. 1987); Castleman 
Constr. Co. v. Pennington, 432 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. 1968). 
 11. See, e.g., Amert, 409 N.W.2d at 663. Double or duplicative recovery by the 
insured is a result which the law has always looked upon with disfavor. It is contrary 
to the principle of indemnity and produces unjust enrichment. 
 12. Subrogation and reimbursement are not synonymous terms despite the fact 
that the primary objective of the former is to achieve the latter. See Smith v. Manville 
Forest Corp., 521 So. 2d 772, 775 (La. Ct. App. 1988). For a detailed discussion of 
the distinction between subrogation and reimbursement, see Mahler v. Szucs, 957 
P.2d 632 (Wash. 1998). 
 13. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 299 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); 
Stancil v. Erie Ins. Co., 740 A.2d 46, 47 (Md. Ct. App. 1999); Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Mut. v. Hrenko, 647 N.E.2d 1358, 1359 (Ohio 1995); Blankenship v. Estate of 
Bain, 5 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1999); Texas Ass’n. of Sch. Bds., Inc. v. Ward, 18 
S.W.3d 256, 258 (Tx. Ct. App. 2000); Houle v. Sch. Dist. of Ashland, 671 N.W.2d 
395 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). 
 14. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 180, 
183, 183 n.1 (Ark. 2001); Century Indem. Co. v. London Underwriters, 16 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 393, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 15. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pac. Rent-All, 978 P.2d 753, 766 n.9 (Haw. 
1999); Hosp. Serv. Corp. of R.I. v. Pa. Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 108-09 (R.I. 1967). 
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a right of subrogation in a person, entity or organization.
16
 The effect of statu-
tory subrogation on legal and contractual subrogation turns upon the intent of 




The distinction between legal, conventional and statutory subrogation 
does not call for a per se rule that equitable principles have no application in 
conventional and statutory subrogation cases.
18
 One explanation for this view 
is that the right of insurance companies to freely contract and limit their li-
ability or impose conditions they deem appropriate upon their obligation to 
provide coverage in a contract of insurance may not be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with public policy B either statutorily or judicially defined.
19
 
Another explanation can be found in the rule that the right of subrogation is 
not absolute.
20
 Consequently, courts in the context of subrogation have re-
  
 16. See Clark, 299 S.E.2d 76; Stancil, 740 A.2d 46; Hrenko, 647 N.E.2d 1358; 
Blankenship, 5 S.W.3d 647; Ward, 18 S.W.3d 256; Houle, 671 N.W.2d 395. 
 17. See Sol v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 921, 924 (Haw. 1994); Podgurski 
v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 821 A.2d 400, 405-06 (Md. Ct. App. 2003); Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. State Bd. for Prop. & Cas. Rates, 637 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. 1981); Paul-
son v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 898 P.2d 353, 355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
“The specific effect that the terms of a statute may have on equitable subrogation, 
contractual subrogation, or both, vary considerably according to the terms of the stat-
ute.” LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALL, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D, vol. 16, § 222:45, 
222-81 (2000). 
 18. See Dixie Nat’l Bank v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 
1147, 1151-52 (Fla. 1985); Underwood v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 551 So. 
2d 522, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that Florida’s medical assistance law, 
which granted the state a right of subrogation as well as lien on recovery by insured, 
allowed application of equitable subrogation principles); Paulson, 898 P.2d at 356 
(stating that legislature’s creation of lien against recovery by insured in addition to a 
right of subrogation suggest that legislature in enacted statute intended to supplant 
equitable subrogation principles). Many jurisdictions recognize that equitable princi-
ples apply to both legal and conventional subrogation except when modified by spe-
cific provisions in the contract. See Allstate Ins. v. Hugh Cole Builder, Inc., 772 So. 
2d 1145, 1146-47 (Ala. 2000); Franklin v. Healthsource of Ark., 942 S.W.2d 837, 840 
(Ark. 1997) (stating that subrogation does not require that a distinction be drawn 
between equitable and conventional subrogation); Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 
699 (Minn. 1983); Castleman Constr. Co. v. Pennington, 432 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tenn. 
1968) (stating that regardless of source of subrogation, right is enforceable only after 
consideration of the equities). 
 19. See, e.g., Liggans R.V. Center v. John Deere Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 567, 569 
(Ala. 1991); W. World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 965 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. 1998); Daun v. 
USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 23 Cal Rptr. 3d 44, 46-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 20. See Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mazzara, 268 So. 2d 814, 817 (Ala. 1972); 
Dixie Nat’l Bank, 463 So. 2d at 1151; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pac. Rent-All, 
Inc., 978 P.2d 753, 771 (Haw. 1999); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Capp, 369 N.E.2d 
672, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); True v. Raines, 99 S.W.3d 439, 446 (Ky. 2003) (stat-
ing that statutory subrogation is not absolute); Stancil, 740 A.2d at 47 (stating that 
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served the right to regulate conventional and statutory subrogation in order to 
maintain fairness between the parties or to serve other important policy 
goals.
21
 Thus, courts are undoubtedly influenced by the fact that subrogation 
is an equitable remedy and equitable principles control its application in de-




Because subrogation is designed to achieve an equitable adjustment of 
rights between the insured and insurer, its contours cannot always be contrac-
tually defined. In other words, whether the right of subrogation arises upon 
payment of proceeds does not turn upon language in the contract of insurance 
itself but upon the type of coverage or line of insurance involved. “Courts 
have tended to inquire into whether the insurance contract is one of ‘indem-
nity’; only if it is a contract of indemnity have many courts allowed subroga-
tion”
23
 in the absence of an expressed provision or statutory authority. Thus, 
  
equitable subrogation is not absolute); Melick v. Stanley, 416 A.2d 415, 418 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); Esparza v. Scott & White Health Plan, 909 S.W.2d 548, 
552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). Whether statutory subrogation is absolute depends upon the 
legislative intent and purpose of statute. See Paulson, 898 P.2d at 356 (stating that 
legislature’s creation of lien against recovery by insured in addition to a right of sub-
rogation suggest that legislature in enacted statute intended to supplant equitable 
subrogation principles); Underwood, 551 So. 2d at 526 (stating that Florida’s medical 
assistance law, which granted the state a right of subrogation as well as lien on recov-
ery by insured, allowed application of equitable subrogation principles); see also 
Winfree v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 554 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa. 1989) (finding statutory 
subrogation absolute). 
 21. See Underwood, 551 So. 2d at 526 (stating that Florda’s medical assistance 
law which granted the state a right of subrogation as well as lien on recovery by in-
sured, allowed application of equitable subrogation principles); Dixie Nat’l Bank, 463 
So. 2d at 1151-52; Paulson, 898 P.2d at 355 (stating that legislature’s creation of lien 
against recovery by insured in addition to a right of subrogation suggest that legisla-
ture in enacted statute intended to supplant equitable subrogation principles). Many 
jurisdictions recognize that equitable principles apply to both legal and conventional 
subrogation except when modified by specific provisions in the contract. See Hugh 
Cole Builder, Inc., 772 So. 2d at 1146-47; Franklin, 942 S.W.2d at 840 (stating that 
subrogation does not require that a distinction be drawn between equitable and con-
ventional subrogation); Westendorf, 330 N.W.2d at 703; Castleman Constr. Co., 432 
S.W.2d at 675 (stating that regardless of source of subrogation, right is enforceable 
only after consideration of the equities); Lyon, 480 P.2d at 744-45. 
 22. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. v. Martinez, 752 P.2d 797, 798 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1988); see also JERRY, supra note 7, § 96(a). 
 23. JERRY, supra note 7, § 96(c). See also Helfend v. S. Cal. Transit, 465 P.2d 61, 
67 n.17 (Cal. 1970); Damhesel v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 209 N.E.2d 
876, 878 (Ill. 1965); Frost v. Porter Leasing Corp., 436 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 
1982); Wolters v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 827 A.2d 197, 200 (N.H. 2003); Suttles v. 
Ry. Mail Ass’n, 141 N.Y.S. 1024, 1026 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913); Ridge Tool Co. v. 
Silva, 515 N.E.2d 945, 946 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Cunningham v. Metro. Life, 360 
N.W.2d 33, 37 (Wis. 1985). 
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courts have uniformly applied the principle of equitable subrogation, even in 
the absence of an expressed subrogation provision in the policy, to property 
and casualty policies.
24
 The rationale for this view is rooted in the notion that 
a property insurer’s sole obligation is to indemnify the insured for its actual 
loss.
25
 Because the insured’s actual loss is generally liquidated in the context 
of property insurance, any excess compensation from the combination of 
insurance proceeds and tort recovery can be determined with certainty. Sub-
rogation is then used to prevent double recovery by requiring the insured to 
return any excess to the insurer. 
Indemnity, subject to the exception for personal insurance, is the princi-
ple on which all insurance against loss is founded.
26
 Indemnity insurance can 
be classified into two types. One is a true “indemnity” policy; the other 
provides indemnity against liability for harm caused by the insured and is 
commonly referred to as a liability policy. A true indemnity policy is only 
enforceable after the insured, as a result of an accident, has experienced an 
actual loss.  
Indemnity against liability, in contrast, is triggered when a third-party 
asserts that the insured is legally liable to it for injury caused. The legal liabil-
ity of the insured to the third-party determines the enforceability of the latter 
type of indemnity policy.
27
 Liability insurance is also generally viewed as an 
indemnity contract.
28
 Because liability insurance is a species of indemnity 
contract, the principle of equitable subrogation has been applied to it under 
the same circumstances as it has in the context of property insurance.
29
 
The principle of indemnity increasingly weakens as the line of insurance 
proceeds from property/casualty and liability to life, health and medical in-
surance. This line of progression is generally used to describe the transforma-
  
 24. See, e.g., Damhesel, 209 N.E.2d 876; Frost, 436 N.E.2d 387; Wolters, 827 
A.2d 197; Perreira v. Rediger, 778 A.2d 429, 437 (N.J. 2001); Suttles, 141 N.Y.S. 
1024; Ridge Tool Co., 515 N.E.2d at 946; but see Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. 
& Light Co., 116 N.W. 633 (Wis. 1908). 
 25. See, e.g., Damhesel, 209 N.E.2d 876; Frost, 436 N.E.2d 387; Perreira, 778 
A.2d 429; Suttles, 141 N.Y.S. 1024; Ridge Tool Co., 515 N.E.2d 945; but see Gatz-
weiler, 116 N.W. 633. 
 26. 1 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.03[4], 1-12 
(Matthew Bender 1991). 
 27. Usually, if the policy indemnifying the insured against loss by reason of 
liability imposed by law contains the familiar provisions for notice of the accident and 
assumption of the investigation and defense by the insurer and provides that no action 
shall lie against the insurer unless loss has been established by judgment against the 
insured, then the policy will be considered a contract against liability to pay damages 
rather than a mere contract of indemnity. LONG, supra note 26, § 1.03[4], 1-13. 
 28. See, e.g., Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 242 A.2d 482 (Md. 1968). Ocean Acci-
dent & Guarantee Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 147 N.E. 351 (N.Y.Ct. App. 
1925); Lawyers Title Guar. Funds v. Sanders, 571 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1977). 
 29. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, § 3.10(3). 
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tion of insurance policies from those of indemnity to those of investment or 
personal contracts.  
Personal insurance is distinguishable from indemnity insurance such as 
property/casualty and liability in that it is insurance upon the person of an 
individual or group of individuals. Insurance, other than personal insurance, 
“in some way involves a res different from the person of the policyholder. In 
personal insurance, however, that is the sole object of concern, and liability of 
the insurer arises, ordinarily, upon the insured’s death or, perhaps, disability 
resulting from accident or illness.”
30
  
Life insurance is generally viewed as an investment contract to which 
the principle of subrogation is rarely, if ever, applied.
31
 The rationale for this 
view was succinctly stated by the court in City of Birmingham v. Walker:
32
 
The doctrine of subrogation applied in indemnity insurance, by 
which insurer is entitled to recover in the name or right of insured 
against a wrongdoer who has caused the destruction of the property 
covered by the policy, has no application to life insurance, for the 
reason that there is no right of action for causing the death of a per-
  
 30. J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1, at 3 
(1981). 
 31. JERRY, supra note 7, § 96(c). It has been suggested that the judicial refusal to 
apply implied subrogation and reluctance to interpret expressed subrogation provi-
sions expansively in life and accident insurance can be explained on the basis of any 
one or a combination of differences between life/accident and property insurance. 
  First, the amount of economic damage is not as readily evaluated in regard to 
loss of a life or an accidental injury to a person as it is in property losses. Placing a 
monetary value on a person’s life, the loss of a limb, or a personal injury is, at best, 
far more of an approximation than determining the market value or replacement cost 
of a building. 
  Second, life and accident insurance policies are seldom in amounts that are 
sufficient to provide full indemnity; property insurance often does so. 
Third, many types of life insurance are approximately viewed as an “investment” as 
well as an “indemnity” contract. When an insurance arrangement involves an invest-
ment component, courts have been inclined to minimize the importance of indemnity 
principles. R. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, § 3.10(6). See also Exch. Bank v. Loh, 
31 S.E. 459, 468 (Ga. 1898) (“The weight of authority is that life insurance is not a 
contract of indemnity.”) (Little, J., concurring specially).  
  The indemnity/investment dichotomy has been severely criticized by at least 
one commentator. Accordingly,  
the crucial distinction is not between indemnity and investment but be-
tween a policy that merely makes the policyholder whole and one that 
pays a specified sum on the happening of the event insured against; i.e. 
[life insurance] is a ‘valued’ policy that is to be regarded as an ‘invest-
ment’ or ‘non-indemnity’ contract, for purposes of subrogation.  
Spencer L. Kimball & Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 
60 MICH. L. REV. 841, 851 (1962). 
 32. 101 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 1958). 
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son except as such remedy is given by statute, and for the further 
reason that life insurance is not a contract of indemnity; and, ac-




The phrase “subrogation not contracted for is not given insurer in case 
of death” does not alter the reality that courts are uniformly opposed to ex-
tending the principles of subrogation to cover life insurance.
34
 For example, 
in Continental Casualty Co. v. Estate of Stanley
35
 the court was asked to en-
force a subrogation provision in favor of an insurer whereby the insurer re-
served in the policy “the right to recover any payments we have made from 
anyone who may be responsible for the insured’s loss.”
36
 Following the death 
of its insured in an airplane crash attributed to Valujet, Continental Casualty 
Company paid the proceeds of the policy and sought to protect its subrogation 
interest by intervening in the wrongful death actions filed by the estate of the 
insured.
37
 The court in Continental Casualty merely classified the policy in 
dispute as a valued policy in which the subject of the insurance was life and 
death, to which the principle of subrogation, “whether contractual or equita-
ble,” does not apply.
38
  
A similar rationale was applied by the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
in Le Mars Mutual Insurance Co. v. Prehn.
39
 Therein, the court addressing 
the subrogation rights of an insurer under an accidental death coverage con-
tained in an automobile insurance policy distinguished indemnity contracts 
from life insurance policies.
40
 Employing a statutory analysis the court con-
cluded that subrogation is inimical to accidental death coverage.
41
  
Policies providing benefits for medical or hospital expenses are generally 
viewed by courts as contracts for personal insurance.
42
 The overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of whether equitable 
subrogation applies to personal insurance contracts have concluded that such 
  
 33. Id. at 253 (citation omitted). 
 34. The cases in which courts have specifically addressed the application of 
subrogation principles to life insurance are extremely rare. This fact, along with dicta 
from other insurance cases, has been construed as evidence in support of the proposi-
tion that neither legal nor conventional subrogation has application in the context of 
life insurance. See Kimball & Davis, supra note 31, at 844. 
 35. 721 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 36. Id. at 432. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 433. 
 39. 238 N.W.2d 274 (S.D. 1975). 
 40. Id. at 276-77. 
 41. Id. at 277. 
 42. See Cunningham v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 33, 37-39 (Wis. 1985). 
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The rationale underlying the prohibition against applying equitable sub-
rogation in the personal contract context was succinctly stated by the court in 
Perreira v. Rediger.
44
 Therein the court observed: 
Subrogation rights are common under policies of property or casu-
alty insurance, wherein the insured sustains a fixed financial loss, 
and the purpose is to place that loss ultimately on the wrongdoer. 
To permit the insured in such instances to recover from both the 
  
 43. See Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 263 So. 2d 149, 151-
54 (Ala. Ct. App. 1972); Am. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 753 S.W.2d 530, 530-
33 (Ark. 1988); Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 274-76 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bowling, 565 P.2d 970, 971-72 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1977); Higgins v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 471, 471-72 
(D.C. 1968); DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1966); GEICO v. Hirsh, 439 S.E.2d 59, 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
subrogation provision void because it constitutes an assignment in violation of Geor-
gia statute), but see Shook v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 813, 814-15 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1988) (holding subrogation provision valid because it does not constitute an 
assignment in violation of the Georgia statute); Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., 524 P.2d 1343, 1344-46 (Idaho 1974); Schultz v. Gotlund, 561 N.E.2d 652, 654 
(Ill. 1990); Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 382 N.E.2d 111, 117-18 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1978), overruled on other grounds, Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478, 
481-82 (Ill. 1981); Imel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 281 N.E.2d 919, 920-21 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1972); S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406 So. 2d 178, 179 (La. 1981); 
McCain Foods, Inc. v. Gerard, 489 A.2d 503, 504-05 (Me. 1985); Frost v. Porter 
Leasing Corp., 436 N.E.2d 387, 389-91 (Mass. 1982); Mich. Med. Serv. v. Sharpe, 64 
N.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Mich. 1954) (en banc); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 245 
N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn. 1976) (en banc); Milbank Ins. Co. v. Henry, 441 N.W.2d 
143, 145 (Neb. 1989); Wolters v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 827 A.2d 197, 200-02 (N.H. 
2003); Perreira v. Rediger, 778 A.2d 429, 437-38 (N.J. 2001); Carver v. Mills, 207 
S.E.2d 394, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); Ridge Tool Co. v. Silva, 515 N.E.2d 945, 946-
47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam); Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 362 N.E.2d 264 
(Ohio 1977) (per curiam); Am. Med. Sec. v. Josephson, 15 P.3d 976, 978 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2000); Geertz v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 451 P.2d 860, 861-63 (Ore. 1969); 
Demmery v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 232 A.2d 21, 24-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967); 
Hamrick v. Hosp. Serv. Corp., 296 A.2d 15 (R.I. 1972); Shumpert v. Time Ins. Co., 
496 S.E.2d 653, 656-58 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 238 N.W.2d 270, 271-72 (S.D. 1975); Wilson v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 
411 S.W.2d 699, 701-02 (Tenn. 1966); Found. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Cody, 458 S.W.2d 
214, 215-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
450 P.2d 458, 458-59 (Utah 1969); Collins v. Blue Cross, 193 S.E.2d 782, 785 (Va. 
1973), supereded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3405(A) (Michie 2004) (prohibit-
ing subrogation provisions in insurance contracts providing hospital and medical 
benefits); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Rader, 166 S.E.2d 157, 161 (W. Va. 1969); Cun-
ningham, 360 N.W.2d at 37-38. 
 44. 778 A.2d 429 (N.J. 2001). 
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In personal insurance contracts, however, the exact loss is never capable 
of ascertainment. Life, death, health, physical well being, and such matters 
are incapable of exact financial estimation. There are, accordingly, not the 
same reasons militating against a double recovery. The general rule is, there-
fore, that the insurer is not subrogated to the insured’s rights or to the benefi-
ciary’s rights under contracts of personal insurance, at least in the absence of 
a policy provision so providing.
46
 
The foregoing rule could easily be construed to mean that the principle 
of equitable subrogation has no application whatsoever to personal insurance 
coverages because the expressed provision is controlling. This construction, 
however, would require that the inherently equitable nature of subrogation be 
completely disregarded. The better construction of the majority rule is that 
equity will not recognize the right of an insurer to be subrogated unless the 
policy contains a provision so providing. The presence of an expressed sub-
rogation provision merely creates in the insurer a right to be subrogated. 
However, as discussed earlier, the contours and the extent to which the in-
surer’s subrogation rights are enforceable are still defined by equity.
47
  
Most insurance policies are packaged products. This merely means that 
most policies provide coverage for personal as well as property protection. 
For example, a typical homeowners policy provides for property, medical and 
liability coverages. The same is true for automobile insurance. A purchaser of 
automobile insurance, at her discretion, is free to purchase, in addition to 
mandatory liability coverage, medical payment, property and uninsured mo-
torist protection. The packaged nature in which insurance is usually produced 
and distributed is not restricted to the individual coverages themselves. 
  
 45. Id. at 438. 
 46. Id. at 438. In Am. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 753 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 
1988), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated the rationale as follows: 
[R]ecovery for medical insurance benefits and tort damages does not nec-
essarily produce a windfall or duplicative recovery. Most always when 
there is tort recovery the consideration for payment by the tortfeasor in-
cludes loss of wages, loss of earning capacity, pain and suffering, perma-
nent or temporary physical impairment, medical expenses, property dam-
ages and intangible losses which are not susceptible to exact measure-
ment. The principles which cause us to recognize equitable subrogation in 
property disputes are not present in the field of medical expense payments 
for personal injuries.  
Id. at 532-33. See also Frost v. Porter Leasing Corp., 436 N.E.2d 387, 390-91 (Mass. 
1982). 
 47. This view is supported by the primary thesis of this article. The majority of 
jurisdictions that have adopted the made whole doctrine in the context of conventional 
subrogation have done so primarily on the basis of equity. 
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Rather, a specific type of coverage such as medical and hospitalization insur-
ance can contain both personal and indemnity features.
48
  
The requirement of an expressed subrogation provision in a personal in-
surance contract demonstrates that indemnity is also a feature of medical, 
hospital and accident insurance.
49
 Consequently, even in the absence of a 
subrogation provision, in a personal insurance contract, the court is arguably 
required to examine the specific provision of the policy pursuant to which 
payment was made and subrogation is being sought to determine whether it is 
of a personal or indemnity nature.
50
 The practice of examining the specific 
provisions of a personal insurance contract to determine its nature further 
supports a construction of the majority rule that recognizes the application of 
equitable principles to personal insurance, even where the policy contains an 
expressed subrogation provision. The unstated and overlooked reality in the 
majority of jurisdictions is that equitable principles can have application in 
personal insurance subrogation disputes between insurers and their insureds 
either in the process of (1) ascertaining the contours of an expressed subroga-
tion provision
51
 or (2) determining whether the proceeds were paid and sub-
rogation is being sought pursuant to a personal or indemnity provision of the 
policy.  
The Pennsylvania Superior Court demonstrated a third and even more 
extreme illustration of the role of equity in a personal insurance subrogation 
dispute in Hollaran v. Larrieu.
52
 Therein, the court entertained the issue of 
whether equitable subrogation applied to a medical insurance policy which 
did not contain an expressed subrogation provision. The court in Hollaran 
relied upon the traditional rationales for equitable subrogration B i.e. prevent 
double recovery and compel discharge of an obligation by the one who in 
good conscience ought to payB to conclude that the subrogee was entitled to 
equitably subrogate its claim even in the absence of an expressed provision. 
In explaining its dramatic divergence from the traditional indem-
nity/investment contract analysis, the court observed that “even if Pennsyl-
vania stands alone in this regard, we would not retreat from our holding.”
53
 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that “[t]he distinction between 
indemnity and [personal] investment contracts for purposes of determining 
legal subrogation is a tenuous one, and courts have been viewed as inept in 
  
 48. See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort 
Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1501-02 (1966); Kimball & Davis, supra note 31, at 851-
60. 
 49. See Cunningham v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Wis. 1985). 
 50. See id. at 34-35. The approach described in the text has only been approved 
in one jurisdiction. It is used merely to demonstrate the extremes to which the indem-
nity/personal insurance dichotomy has and can carry the court. 
 51. See RUSS & SEGALL, supra note 17, at § 222:22. 
 52. 637 A.2d 317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
 53. Id. at 322. 
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 Because most modern insurance policies contain indemnity 
and personal contract features, “the old rule that an indemnity contract gives 
rise to legal subrogation while a liability contract affords only conventional 
subrogation, can be sustained only with difficulty.”
55
  
A minority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the view that neither eq-
uitable nor contractual subrogation applies to medical payment coverage.
56
 
These jurisdictions, like their majority counterparts, recognize that medical 
payment policies are personal insurance contracts. However, according to the 
minority view, allowing subrogation in this context would run afoul of the 
common law prohibitions against splitting of a personal injury cause of action 
and/or assigning a personal injury action.
57
 Decisional law demonstrates that 
these two arguments serve as the favored basis for precluding the application of 
subrogation to medical payment policies among the jurisdictions that continue 
to follow the minority view.
58
 Nevertheless, public policy has also been recog-
nized as an alternative rationale for the view that medical payment subrogation 
clauses are invalid.
59
 In Youngblood v. American States Insurance Co.,
60
 the 
court observed that the public policy considerations included the facts that: 
(1) [T]he insured paid a premium for medical payment coverage; 
(2) the insured is the one likely to suffer most if medical payments 
received must be repaid out of a third-party recovery; and (3) the 
tortfeasor’s carrier may consider that the injured person has already 
been paid medical expenses and can make a smaller offer which al-




 54. Cunningham, 360 N.W.2d at 42 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Kimball & Davis, supra note 31, at 851-60); see also Ridge 
Tool Co. v. Silva 515 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (George, J., dissenting). 
 55. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 242 A.2d 482, 487 (Md. 1968). 
 56. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Ariz. 1978). Compare 
GEICO v. Hirsh, 439 S.E.2d 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating subrogation provi-
sion because it constitutes an assignment in violation of Georgia statue), with Shook 
v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (validating subrogation 
provision because it does not constitute an assignment in violation of the Georgia 
statute). See also Durrett v. Bryan, 799 P.2d 110 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (prohibiting 
medical subrogation by statute); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Swanson v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 46 P.3d 584 
(Mont. 2002); Youngblood v. Am. States Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 203, 206 (Mont. 1993); 
Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1986) (per curiam). 
 57. See Rinehart v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 524 P.2d 1343 (Ida. 1974); 
Youngblood, 866 P.2d at 206. 
 58. See Druke, 576 P.2d at 491; Hirsh, 439 S.E.2d at 60; Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 
at 425; Swanson, 46 P.3d at 590. 
 59. See, e.g., Youngblood, 866 P.2d at 205, 207-08; Maxwell, 728 P.2d at 815. 
 60. 866 P.2d 203. 
 61. Id. at 207. 
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The minority view, unlike its majority counterparts, locks and bolts all the 
doors and windows through which equitable principles might seek subsequent 
entry into the analysis of a subrogation dispute between an insurer and its 
insured. 
The expansion of subrogation to personal insurance can be attributed as 
much to industry efforts as to the common law rationales for the doctrine. 
First, the insurance industry, encouraged by the rule of law, moved quickly to 
include subrogation provisions in medical and hospital coverages, uninsured 
motorist coverage and medical payment coverages in automobile policies. 
Second, and equally effective, as insurance gained prominence as a necessity 
in American society, the insurance industry hailed subrogation as a chief 
mechanism for maintaining low insurance premiums. Thus, one proponent of 
the expansion of subrogation observed that: 
If subrogation recovery were not available or were disregarded, the 
actual cost of insuring the past known risk would increase accord-
ingly and the projected future costs would likewise have to be ad-
justed upward. Subrogation costs not recovered are thus reflected 
in and spread over future premiums among the issuing insurer and 
all of the insureds purchasing the same insurance. As a result, all 
who shared the risk during the time the claim was paid, and all 
who share the future risk, subsidize the payment to an insured who 
did not honor his or her subrogation agreement.
62
 
Despite their seemingly universal appeal, the rationales underlying sub-
rogation have not gone unchallenged. For example, opponents of the expan-
sion of subrogation into personal insurance contend that “[i]n most [personal 




This [contention] is true due to the fact that the ‘exact loss’ is diffi-
cult, if not impossible to ascertain, because items such as mental 
anguish and physical pain are not insurable and are rarely fully re-
coverable from tortfeasors. . . . Second, subrogation is disruptive of 
the settlement process which takes place between the insured and 
tortfeasor. . . . Third, in situations involving multiple subrogation 
claims, disagreements between the insured and the insurers or dis-
agreements between the multiple subrogees also tend to complicate 
and prolong the settlement process. . . . Finally, subrogation en-
  
 62. Joseph Du Bray, A Response to the Anti-Subrogation Argument: What Really 
Emerged from Pandora’s Box, 41 S.D. L. REV. 264, 274 (1996). See also Fleming, 
supra note 48; Kimball & Davis, supra note 31. 
 63. R. Barron, Subrogation: Pandora’s Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV. 
237, 242 (1996). 
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courages delay in the payment of first party benefits because the 
first party insurer has a motive to deny payment, hoping that the 
insured will first obtain a recovery from the tortfeasor.
64
 
A number of courts have criticized the “double recovery” rationale to 
the point of recognizing that it is the insurer who is unjustly enriched and 
gains a windfall if allowed both subrogation and retention of the premiums 
paid by the insured.
65
 Furthermore, subrogation has not led to lower premium 
costs for the insured.
66
 
The preceding discussion demonstrates the complexity of and confusion 
surrounding the application of subrogation. The doctrine, now a cornerstone 
of the insurance industry, has become a double edged sword used primarily to 
the detriment of insurance consumers. Contemporary courts have sought to 
ameliorate the harsh effect of subrogation in the context of personal insurance 
by re-emphasizing its inherently equitable purpose and nature. Thus, courts 
have increasingly employed the equitable made whole doctrine to counterbal-
ance the harsh result that would otherwise befall an insured who is forced to 
waive her right to complete compensation to her competing insurer. 
II. THE MADE WHOLE DOCTRINE 
The common law made whole doctrine is an equitable principle which 
generally limits the ability of an insurer to exercise its right of subrogation 
until the insured has been fully compensated or made whole. Under this con-
ceptualization, in the event of a subrogation dispute between the insurer and 
its insured, the insured has priority of rights to collect from the responsible 
third party. Thus, where the insured’s recovery from both the insurer and 
tortfeasor is less than or equal to its loss the insurer forfeits its right to subro-
gation.  
  
 64. Id. at 245-46. 
 65. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489 (Ariz. 1978); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Reitler, 628 P.2d 667 (Mont. 1981); Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 812 
(Nev. 1986); DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1966). 
 66. See, e.g., Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525, 527 n.9 (Alaska 
1976); Druke, 576 P.2d 489, 492 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc); Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); DeCespedes, 193 So. 2d  at 
227-28. See also EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 151-52 (2d 
ed. 1957); Barron, supra note 63, at 242; Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
316 N.W.2d 348, 355 n.4 (Wis. 1982); Shelter Ins. Co. v. Frohlich, 498 N.W.2d 74, 
82 (Neb. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Dailey, 
687 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 2004); JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 234 
(2d ed. West 1989). 
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Alabama 
Alabama first adopted the made whole rule in International Underwrit-
ers/Brokers, Inc. v. Liao.
67
 The court in Liao recognized that subrogation, 
whether legal or conventional, is governed by equitable principles such as the 
made whole doctrine.
68
 However, in the context of conventional subrogation 
the parties are free to contractually modify the doctrine even where the in-
sured’s recovery from the insurer and tortfeasor did not equal complete com-
pensation for the loss.
69
 According to the Liao court, the agreement, in order 
to effectively preclude application of the made whole rule, must “expressly 
provide” that the made whole doctrine will not apply.
70
 “In other words, the 
made-whole doctrine . . . appl[ies] in all subrogation cases unless the contract 
‘expressly provides’ that it does not apply.”
71
  
The Liao opinion was short lived. Less than a year later, the court re-
versed Liao in Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama.
72
 In Powell, a 
plurality of the court agreed that the right of subrogation, whether equitable 
or contractual, does not arise until the insured has been fully compensated or 
made whole for the loss.
73
 Powell effectively ruled that the parties to the pol-
icy could not contract out of the equitable made whole principle.
74
  
Nearly a decade after the Powell decision the Alabama Supreme Court 
revisited the made whole doctrine in Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Hannig.
75
 Therein, the court, motivated by its perception of the “ineq-
uitable consequences that can result from a strict, across-the-board, applica-
tion of the ‘made-whole’ rule without regard to the express desires of the 
insured or the type of insurance involved,” overturned Powell and reinstated 
Liao as the law in Alabama.
76
  
Accordingly, the made whole doctrine again became a default rule ap-
plicable only where the contract did not “expressly provide” otherwise. An 
Alabama court first addressed what the Liao court meant when it observed 
that a contract must “expressly provide” that the made whole doctrine will not 
apply in Wolfe v. Alfa Mutual Insurance Co.
77
 In Wolfe, a consolidated case, 
  
 67. 548 So. 2d 163 (Ala. 1989), overruled by Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 581 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 1990) (per curiam), reinstated by Ex parte State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 2000). 
 68. Id. at 165. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Wolfe v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 880 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). 
 72. 581 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 1990) (per curiam), overruled by Ex parte State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d 543. 
 73. Id. at 773. 
 74. Id. at 777. 
 75. 764 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 2000). 
 76. Id. at 545-46 (citation omitted). 
 77. 880 So. 2d 1163 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). 
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two insureds argued that they had not been made whole and that language 
contained in Alfa Mutual’s medical payment coverage of their automobile 




The court totally rejected the notion that in order to “expressly provide” 
otherwise the provision must use the “magic words” made whole.
79
 Instead, 
the court found that the pertinent provision need only provide a scheme “con-
trary to established equitable principles.”
80
 This determination, whether the 
provision provides a scheme “contrary to established equitable principles,” is 
made on the basis of the language used.
81
 The first of the two paragraphs at 
issue stated that “if Alfa makes a payment to its insured, and if that insured 
has a right to recover damages from another, [Alfa] shall be subrogated to 
that right.”
82
 This language, according to the court, simply gave Alfa a right 
of subrogation and such “general” subrogation language is “not sufficient to 
modify the applicability of the made-whole doctrine.”
83
  
The second paragraph stated that “[I]f [Alfa] make[s] a payment under 
this policy and [the insured] recovers damages from another, [the insured] 
shall hold in trust for [Alfa] the proceeds of the recovery and shall reimburse 
[Alfa] to the extent of [Alfa’s] payment, costs and fees.”
84
 According to the 




Alabama follows a narrow version of the made whole rule which is fur-
ther diminished in application because only the insured has standing to assert 
it.
86
 Furthermore, while calculation of whether an insured has been made 
whole “requires consideration of every payment made to, or on behalf of, the 
[insured] that arises out of the [loss] sustained,” attorneys’ fees incurred by 
the insured in making the recovery from the tortfeasor are not considered.
87
 
The potential harshness of the rule allowing the insurer to contract out of 
the “made-whole doctrine” has not gone unnoticed by the court. In his con-
curring opinion in Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Justice Lyon 
proposed three options which might be employed as a solution in cases where 
  
 78. Id. at 1166-67. 
 79. Id. at 1167-69. 
 80. Id. at 1167 (citation omitted). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1166 (citation omitted). 
 83. Id. at 1167. 
 84. Id. (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. at 1167-68. 
 86. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 792 So. 2d 369, 
372-73 (Ala. 2000). 
 87. Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 So. 2d 772, 781 (Ala. 1990) (per 
curiam), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 764 
So. 2d 543 (Ala. 2000); see also CNA Ins. Cos. v. Johnson Galleries, 639 So. 2d 
1355, 1359 (Ala. 1994). 
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the application of the rule would lead to an intolerable conclusion: “1. To 
nullify or reform the contract on the basis of fraud[;] . . . 2. [t]o nullify or 
reform the contract so as to eliminate any unconscionable provisions[; or] . . . 




In Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bough,
89
 the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas addressed the issues of whether: (1) an insurer had properly made 
underinsured motorists benefits available to its insured; and (2) the insurer 
was prejudiced by the insured’s release of the third-party tortfeasor.
90
 In ad-
dressing these issues the court observed: 
Although we have no criticism of the cases cited by Bough, the 
rule limiting the insurer’s right to subrogation in those cases is not 
applicable to the facts here. The equitable nature of subrogation is 
granted an insurer to prevent the insured from receiving a double 
recovery. Thus, while the general rule is that an insurer is not enti-
tled to subrogation unless the insured has been made whole for his 
loss, the insurer should not be precluded from employing its right 
of subrogation when the insured has been fully compensated and is 
in a position where the insured will recover twice for some of his 
or her damages. That is the situation here.
91
 
The court, less than a year later, in Higginbotham v. Arkansas Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield,
92
 addressed for the first time the specific issue of 
whether an insurer’s expressed right of subrogation takes priority over the 
insured’s equitable right to be made whole. The court began its analysis by 
resolving that “the excerpt from Bough was dictum” and therefore of no pre-
cedential value.
93
 According to the court in Higginbotham, equitable princi-
ples such as the made whole rule may be appropriate to the doctrine of legal 
or equitable subrogation, but not to subrogation rights which arise out of an 
expressed agreement between the insured and insurer.
94
 Thus, the court con-





 88. 764 So. 2d 543, 547 (Ala. 2000) (Lyons, J., concurring specially). 
 89. 834 S.W.2d 637 (Ark. 1992). 
 90. Id. at 639-40. 
 91. Id. at 641. 
 92. 849 S.W.2d 464 (Ark. 1993), overruled by Franklin v. Healthsource of Ar-
kansas, 942 S.W.2d 837 (Ark. 1997). 
 93. Id. at 466. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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The court’s holding in Higginbotham was short lived. In Franklin v. 
Healthsource of Arkansas,
96
 the court retreated from its previous position and 
concluded that as to the priority of subrogation rights of insurer versus in-
sured, where both parties have claims against a partial settlement from a 
third-party, equity mandates that the insured’s claim be given priority.
97
 Thus, 
“an insurer is entitled to enforce its contractual right of subrogation after the 
insured has been fully compensated, or ‘made whole,’ for his total loss.”
98
 
The bottom line is that “the equitable nature of subrogation requires that no 




Arkansas’ strict adherence to the common law made whole doctrine has 
led to its application to statutory subrogation rights arising out of the payment 
of workers’ compensation benefits.
100
 The court has, however, refused to 
apply the doctrine to state statutory subrogation rights that arise out of the 




In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Ingebretsen,
102
 the made whole doctrine 
gained perdurable recognition in the law of insurance subrogation in Califor-
nia. In Travelers, a consolidated opinion, multiple insureds recovered insur-
ance proceeds for damages caused to their property by the County of Los 
Angeles.
103
 Each policy contained a standard subrogation clause allowing the 
company to “require from the insured an assignment of all right of recovery 




The insureds also executed a subrogation receipt or release, acknowl-
edgment of satisfaction, agreement to immediate cancellation and assignment 
of subrogation document contemporaneously with receiving the insurance 
proceeds.
105
 The respective insurance companies also hired their own attorney 




 96. 942 S.W.2d 837 (Ark. 1997). 
 97. Id. at 839-40. 
 98. Id. at 839. 
 99. Id. at 840. 
 100. See, e.g., S. Cent. Ark. Elec. Coop. v. Buck, 117 S.W.3d 591, 594-96 (Ark. 
2003); Travelers Ins. Co. v. O’Hara, 84 S.W.3d 419, 421 (Ark. 2002). 
 101. Ark. Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Estate of Ferrel, 984 S.W.2d 807 (Ark. 1999). 
 102. 113 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). 
 103. Id. at 682. 
 104. Id. at 681. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 681-82. 
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Ultimately, the insureds recovered a judgment to which the insurance compa-
nies asserted a third party claim based on the subrogation agreements.
107
 
On appeal, the insureds argued that the insurance companies should be 
denied any recovery until they had been made whole for the damages suf-
fered.
108
 The insurance companies disagreed with insureds’ contention that 
they had not been made whole by the judgments against the county and the 
insurance payments.
109
 The insurers further argued that “in any event [the 
insurance companies] are entitled to a priority [of payment] out of the judg-
ment against the county.”
110
 
The court in Travelers, relying upon Section 2071 of the California In-
surance Code and decisional law from Ohio, concluded that where the subro-
gation provision and subrogation assignment convey “all right of recovery 
against any party for loss to the extent that payment therefore is made by this 
company,” entitles the insurer to first and total indemnification.
111
 The in-
surer’s priority of right however was conditioned on it having cooperated and 
assisted in the recovery from the third-party.
112
 
The insureds in Travelers further contended that the insurers were not 
entitled to recovery because it was impossible to ascertain what portion of the 
judgment represented damages paid for by the companies.
113
 According to the 
insureds, a portion of the judgment against the county was for noninsured 
losses, and consequently, the insurers should be denied recovery unless they 
could prove what portion of the judgment was attributable to covered 
losses.
114
 The court, again relying on the all right of recovery language con-
tained in the subrogation clause, concluded that all claims of the insureds had 
been transferred to the insurers.
115
 Therefore, insurers were not required to 
prove what portion of the judgment was attributable to covered losses.
116
 
The requirements for application of the rule of Travelers have been 
strictly applied. For example, in Sapiano v. Williamsburg National Insurance 
Co.,
117
 the court concluded that in contrast to the policy and insurer in Trav-
elers, (1) the language of the subrogation clause at issue contained general 
terms, and (2) the insurer did not cooperate or assist the insured in its efforts 
to recover from the tortfeasor.
118
 Because of these defects the insured retained 
  
 107. Id. at 682. 
 108. Id. at 682-83. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 684. 
 111. Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 685. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 686-87. 
 116. Id. 
 117. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). See also Plut v. Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 118. Sapiano, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662. 
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priority of right and was entitled to be made whole before the insurer could 
assert its right to subrogation.
119
 Like Alabama, California adheres to the 
view that the parties are free to agree that the made whole rule does not apply. 
However, unlike Alabama, which imposes only one condition (i.e. that the 
agreement be sufficiently specific), California imposes an additional require-
ment that the insurer cooperate and assist the insured in the recovery. Also as 
in Alabama, the potential harsh and one-sided effect of expanding the princi-
ple of conventional subrogation has not gone unnoticed in California. 
In Samura v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, the court responded to 
this concern by suggesting that the doctrine of unconscionability could be 
used to counter this problem.
120
 Admitting that it was unaware of any cases in 
which the doctrine had been applied,
121
 the court nevertheless observed: 
In short, the third party liability provision may sometimes operate 
in a harsh and one-sided manner without any justification, which 
raises the possible application of the doctrine of unconscionability. 
As embodied in Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a), the 
concept of unconscionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘sub-
stantive’ element. ‘The former includes (1) ‘oppression,’ which re-
fers to an inequality of bargaining power resulting in no real nego-
tiation and the absence of meaningful choice; and (2) ‘surprise,’ 
which occurs when the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bar-
gain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seek-
ing to enforce the disputed terms. . . . ‘Substantive’ unconscion-
ability consists of an allocation of risks or costs which is overly 
harsh or one-sided and is not justified by the circumstances in 
which the contract is made. . . . Presumably both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability must be present before a contract 
will be held unenforceable. However, a relatively larger degree of 
one will compensate for a relatively smaller degree of the other.’
122
 
Pursuant to statutory interpretation and an assessment of legislative in-
tent, California has adopted the common law made whole doctrine in the con-
text of uninsured motorist coverage.
123
 However, the insurer has priority of 
rights and is entitled to be subrogated from the tortfeasor prior to the insured 
  
 119. Id. at 660. 
 120. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 121. See also Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 2000) 
(Lyons, J., concurring) (wherein he makes same observation). 
 122. Samura, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-28 (1993) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. v. Super Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (quotation omitted). 
 123. See Sapiano v. Williamsburg Nat’l. Ins. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 661 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
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being made whole in the context of underinsured motorist coverage
124
 and, 




The question of whether a conventional subrogation provision can dis-
place the made whole rule in a subrogation dispute between an insurer and its 
insured was first addressed by the courts of Colorado in Kral v. American 
Mutual Insurance Co.
126
 In Kral, the insurer attempted to rely upon a subro-
gation provision contained in the policy and a release-trust agreement to sup-
port its argument that it possessed a priority of right to assert its subrogation 
claim against the proceeds recovered from the tortfeasor, without regards to 
whether the insured had received full compensation.
127
 Kral, the insured, con-
tended that both the subrogation provision in the policy and the release-trust 
agreement were unenforceable because they were contrary to public policy.
128
 
The court, despite its rejection of Kral’s primary contention that both the sub-
rogation provision and the release-trust agreement were unenforceable as a 
matter of public policy, agreed that in the context of uninsured motorist cov-
erage any attempt by the insurer to assert a subrogation right was unenforce-
able to the extent that the exercise of such right would impair the ability of 
the insured to be made whole for losses caused by an uninsured motorist.
129
 
This question was also addressed by the court in the context of statutory 
subrogation rights in Marquez v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance 
Co.
130
 Therein, the court considered the issue of whether Section 10-4-713(1) 
of the Colorado No Fault Act gave priority of rights to the insurance provider 
to assert its subrogation or reimbursement right prior to the insured being 
made whole.
131
 The insurer argued that by virtue of the subrogation provision 
in the policy and the No Fault Act it was entitled to priority of right even if 
the insured had not been completely compensated.
132
 The court in Marquez 
concluded that the legislative intent and purpose of the No Fault Act was to 
allow an insured to be made whole before the insurer could diminish the re-
covery by asserting either subrogation or reimbursement.
133
 Thus, the insured 
  
 124. See Holcomb v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 281 Cal. Rptr. 651, 653 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 125. Gapusan v. Jay, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250, 254 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 126. 784 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1989) (en banc). 
 127. Id. at 761. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 765. 
 130. 620 P.2d 29 (Colo. 1980) (en banc). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 30. 
 133. Id. at 32. 
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has priority of right to the recovery, except where the amount of the recovery 
plus the insurance proceeds would constitute a double or excess recovery.
134
 
Express subrogation provisions do not violate public policy under both 
the No Fault Act and the Uninsured Motorist Law of Colorado. However, 
their enforceability under both statutes hinges on the insured first being made 
whole. Unlike the No Fault Act and the Uninsured Motorist Law, the lan-
guage of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado suggests that the legis-
lature intended that insurers be subrogated to the rights of the claimant.
135
 
Nevertheless, the court in Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority v. 
Jorgensen,
136
 concluded that the insurer’s right to subrogation was not abso-
lute and does not extend to every right that the claimant or his dependents 
have against the tortfeasor.
137
 According to the court, the insurer’s right to 
seek subrogation prior to the insured receiving complete recovery is limited 
in two respects. First, the insurer is only subrogated to the claimant’s right to 
recover economic damages.
138
 Consequently, if the parties fail to do so in the 
settlement, the court has jurisdiction to apportion the proceeds between eco-
nomic and noneconomic damages.
139
 Second, the insurer’s right of subroga-
tion is limited solely to the claimant’s right to recover economic damages.
140
 
Thus, the insurer cannot assert its subrogation right against the recovery for 
claims belonging to dependents.
141
 These limitations may be ignored, how-
ever, if the court finds that the insured negotiated or structured the settlement 
in a way that circumvents the insurer’s subrogation rights.
142
 In such a case, 
the subrogation rights of the insurer can reach any portion of the recovery 




The Connecticut courts have found that the right of subrogation, 
whether provided for in the contract of insurance or not, is equitable.
144
 Ac-
cording to this analysis a conventional subrogation provision is not the source 
of the right. Rather, conventional subrogation agreements merely confirm the 
principles of equitable subrogation which would exist even in the absence of 
  
 134. Id. at 31. 
 135. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-203(1) (2003). 
 136. 992 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
 137. Id. at 1165. 
 138. Id. at 1163-64. 
 139. Id. at 1160. 
 140. Id. at 1165. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1166. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Wasko v. Manella, 849 A.2d 777, 781 (Conn. 2004). 
File: Parker Created on:  10/9/2005 4:57 PM Last Printed: 10/16/2005 4:24 PM 








[U]nder traditional principles of subrogation, if an insured brings 
an action against a negligent party, an insurer generally is entitled 
to recover the amount it paid to the insured only if the amount of 
damages awarded exceeds the difference between the amount the 
insurer paid and the insured’s actual damages.
147
 
This analysis is also applicable to statutory subrogation unless the legis-
lature provided the insurer with an inviolate statutory right of subrogation in 
the statute. In Wasko, the court found that the statutory language, providing 
that the employer’s claim “shall take precedence over that of the injured em-
ployee in [distribution of] the proceeds of the recovery.”
148
 provided insurers 
an inviolate right to subrogation under the workers’ compensation law.
149
 In 
contrast, the legislative language creating the standard form fire insurance 
policy, “[t]his Company may require from the insured an assignment of all 
right of recovery against any party for loss to the extent that payment therefor 
is made by this Company,”
150





In Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Martin,
152
 the court was asked 
to determine the subrogation rights of an insurer that, in the absence of a loan 
receipt or assignment of subrogation agreement, sought to assert a subroga-
tion claim pursuant to an expressed provision contained in the policy.
153
 In 
Martin, all parties stipulated that the insured’s property damage totaled 
$111,000 and that the maximum possible recovery from the tortfeasor’s in-
surer, tortfeasor, and Farm Bureau would total only $95,035.
154
 Farm Bureau 





 Therein, the court declared that: 
  
 145. Id. at 782. 
 146. 849 A.2d 777. 
 147. Id. at 784. 
 148. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-293(a) (2003). 
 149. Wasko, 849 A.2d at 784. 
 150. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-307 (2003). 
 151. Wasko, 849 A.2d at 783. 
 152. 377 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). 
 153. Id. at 828. 
 154. Id. 
 155. 181 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
 156. Martin, 377 So. 2d at 828-29. 
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If the insurer pays a claim for a loss caused by the negligence of a 
third person and requests the insured to prosecute his claim against 
the tort-feasor, assists in the prosecution of the claim, and bears its 
share of the burden of preparing the case for trial, it is entitled, out 
of the judgment recovered, to the amount which it has paid on ac-
count of the loss, notwithstanding the judgment recovered is not, 




Martin, on the other hand, argued that the case should be governed by 
the principles announced in Central National Insurance Group v. Hotte,
158
 as 
quoted from 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1209(b): 
If an insured obtains satisfaction from the wrongdoer and has pre-
viously received payment of the loss from the company, he must 
account therefor to the company, the general rule being that the 
company may recover from insured only the excess, which insured 
has received from the wrongdoer causing the loss, remaining after 
insured is fully compensated for his loss and the cost and expenses 
of the recovery thereof.
159
  
After distinguishing the facts of the principle case from Morgan,
160
 the 
court concluded that, in the absence of specific provisions in the policy, equi-
table principles controlled in subrogation disputes between insurers and their 
insureds even when the right of subrogation is based on an expressed provi-
sion in the contract of insurance. “In the absence of specific terms [in the 
policy] to the contrary, the insured is entitled to be made whole before the 




 157. Id. at 829 (citing Morgan, 181 So. 2d at 178-79). 
 158. 312 So. 2d 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
 159. Martin, 377 So. 2d at 829 (quoting Hotte, 312 So. 2d at 237). 
 160. The rationale used by the court in distinguishing Morgan suggests that cau-
tion be used in determining the applicablility of the made whole doctrine. The court, 
in choosing the controlling rule of law, found persuasive the facts that the insured 
sought the maximum amount recoverable from the tortfeasor and its insured, and the 
insurer, Florida Farm Bureau, did not significantly assist in the prosecution of the 
claim. Martin, 377 So. 2d at 831. 
 161. Id. at 830. Compare Collins v. Wilcott, 587 So. 2d 742, 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) (an exception to the general rule can be created in a settlement agree-
ment), with Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Lexow, 602 So. 2d 528, 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (trial court concluded that subrogation receipt merely acknowledged insurer’s 
common law right of subrogation was not appealed). 
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In the context of medical insurance, an insurer has no common law right 
of subrogation.
162
 However, where the insured has been made whole and is 
likely to receive a double recovery, equity recognizes the right of the insurer 
to seek subrogation.
163
 The common law made whole rule can also be statuto-
rily abrogated. However, as with conventional subrogation, in order to alter 
the common law rule the statute must be clear and express. Thus, in the con-
text of statutory subrogation, Florida courts have found a legislative intent to 
modify the made whole rule with regards to both the Collateral Source of 
Indemnity
164




The made whole or complete compensation rule was adopted as a part of 
the insurance subrogation law of Georgia in Duncan v. Integon General In-
surance Co.
166
 The issue before the court in Duncan was whether the com-
plete compensation or made whole rule is applicable to an insurance policy 
provision which requires the insured to reimburse the insurer the amounts 
paid under medical payments coverage.
167
 The policy provision at issue in 
Duncan provided: “[i]f we make a payment under this policy and the person 
to or for whom payment is made recovers damages from another, that person 
shall: 1. [h]old in trust for us the proceeds of the recovery; and 2. reimburse 
us to the extent of our payment.”
168
  
According to the court, because the policy did not expressly address 
whether the made whole rule would or would not operate as a limitation on 
the insured’s right to complete compensation it must be strictly construed 
against the insurer.
169
 As a result of the absence of an expressed provision 
specifying that the made whole rule does not apply, the rule implicitly applies 
and mandates complete compensation.
170
  
The court in Duncan relied on two rationales for its holding. First, the 
clear weight of authority recognizes that, in the absence of a provision to the 
contrary, equity dictates that the insured be fully compensated for the loss 
covered by the policy.
171
 Second, the court concluded that the public policy of 
  
 162. Centex-Rodgers Constr. Co. v. Herrera, 761 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 163. Humana Health Plans v. Lawton, 675 So. 2d 1382, 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 164. Magsipoc v. Larsen, 639 So. 2d 1038, 1041-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 165. State of Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Estabrook, 711 So. 2d 161, 
164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 166. 482 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. 1997). 
 167. Id. at 353. 
 168. Id. at 326. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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Georgia supports the rule that an insurer may not obtain reimbursement 
unless and until its insured has been completely compensated.
172
 As observed 
by the court, “[t]hese considerations of public policy and equitable principals 
of subrogation are so strong that some jurisdictions declare that any insurance 
policy provision which modifies the complete compensation rule is unen-
forceable and void.”
173
 Nevertheless, because the policy at issue did not con-
tain such a provision, the court refused to address the issue of whether a pro-
vision contravening public policy or equitable principles of subrogation 
would be unenforceable and void.
174
  
In Davis v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Georgia, Inc.,
175
 the court 
resolved the issue of whether a policy containing an express provision modi-
fying the made whole rule was unenforceable and void as a matter of public 
policy.
176
 The policy provision in question provided in pertinent part: “[e]ven 
if the total amount you collect is less than your actual losses from the acci-
dent, you must pay us.”
177
 The court in Davis, relying upon its earlier deci-
sion in Duncan and Section 33-24-56(1) of the Georgia Code, concluded that 
the public policy of Georgia: 
will not permit insurers to require an insured to agree to a provi-
sion that permits the insurer, at the expense of the insured, to avoid 
the risk for which the insurer has been paid by requiring the in-
sured to reimburse the insurer whether or not the insured was com-
pletely compensated for the covered loss.
178
 
Therefore, the court concluded, policy provisions modifying the made whole 
rule are unenforceable as violative of public policy.
179
 This same public pol-
icy rationale is reflected in the workers’ compensation laws of Georgia.
180
 
Consequently, workers’ compensation carriers are not entitled to assert their 





 172. Id. at 326-27. 
 173. Id. at 327. 
 174. Id. 
 175. 521 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. 1999). 
 176. Id. at 816. 
 177. Id. at 817 n.1. 
 178. Id. at 818. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11.1(b); Bartow County Bd. of Ed. v. Ray, 494 
S.E.2d 29, 30-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
 181. See N. Bros. Co. v. Thomas, 513 S.E.2d 251, 253 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Canal 
Ins. Group v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 570 S.E.2d 60, 66 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
File: Parker Created on:  10/9/2005 4:57 PM Last Printed: 10/16/2005 4:24 PM 
750 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70  
 
Hawaii 
The made whole rule has been endorsed in the context of uninsured 
motorist coverage in Hawaii. In the seminal case of AIG Hawaii Insurance 
Co., Inc. v. Rutledge, the court was asked to determine whether an insurer 
could enforce a policy provision requiring reimbursement of uninsured mo-
torist benefits from its fully compensated insured.
182
 In addition to the re-
imbursement provision in the policy, the insureds executed separate Release 
and Trust Agreements after receiving the policy proceeds.
183
 The insureds 
subsequently filed suit against joint tortfeasors and received an arbitration 




Because the court in AIG viewed the problem as one calling for statu-
tory interpretation, it did not address the question of “whether AIG is enti-
tled to be reimbursed under the terms of the policy.”
185
 Though no Hawaii 
statute governed the subject of reimbursement of uninsured motorist bene-
fits, the court determined that the intent and purpose of the uninsured mo-
torist law was to effect the greatest possible recovery for the insured and 
prevent double recovery.
186
 Given this intent and purpose, the court aligned 




The extent to which the common law made whole rule can be modified 
by a provision in the policy has not been addressed by the court. Neverthe-
less, the court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pacific Rent-All en-
gaged in a detailed discussion of the rules applicable to both conventional 
and equitable subrogation.
188
 However, as in AIG, the court resolved the 
dispute without expressly aligning itself with or adopting any of the com-
peting views.
189
 In the context of the made whole rule, Hawaii courts have 
adopted a transitional approach comparable to a way station on the road to 
unraveling the enigma trapped within a mystery. 
  
 182. 955 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998). 
 183. Id. at 1071. 
 184. Id. at 1072. 
 185. Id. at 1073. See also supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text. 
 186. Id. at 1076. 
 187. Id. at 1078. 
 188. 978 P.2d 753 (Haw. 1999). 
 189. Id. 
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Illinois 
In Illinois the terms of the insurance policy determine the rights of the 
parties in a subrogation dispute.
190
 The contract provision, in order to displace 
the equitable made whole rule, need not be specific but only enforceable.
191
 
Because subrogation provisions are generally viewed as enforceable in Illinois 
this requirement is easily satisfied by the standardized language typically used 
in reimbursement and subrogation provisions. Even though the terms of the 
contract govern the rights of the parties to subrogation, an insurer is precluded 
from exercising the right of subrogation until it has paid the insured’s damages 
pursuant to the policy creating the subrogation right.
192
  
Illinois courts have expressed a public policy based preference for the 
made whole rule in the context of subrogation disputes arising in wrongful 
death cases.
193
 This preference is also arguably applicable where an insurer 
initially seeks to avoid liability on the policy and subsequently recants and pur-




In Indiana the right of subrogation cannot be enforced until the whole debt 
is paid and the insured is thereby made whole.
195
 This rule applies to contrac-
tual as well as conventional subrogation.
196
 The parties may contractually agree 
that the rule will not have application.
197
 However the contractual provision, to 
be enforceable, “must be clear, unequivocal and so certain as to admit no doubt 
on the question.”
198
 This standard has been applied in the context of both the 
uninsured motorist act and the workers’ compensation laws of Indiana.
199
 De-
spite the fact that no Indiana court has defined what is meant by “clear and 
unequivocal,” the standardized language commonly found in subrogation 




 190. Capitol Indem. Corp., v. Strike Zone, 646 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995); In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605, 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 191. Strike Zone, 646 N.E.2d at 311-12. 
 192. Eddy v. Sybert, 783 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Benge v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 193. In re Estate of Schmidt, 398 N.E.2d 589, 590 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Nat’l. 
Bank v. Podgorski, 373 N.E.2d 82, 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
 194. See Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 262 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1970); see also In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d at 607 (discussing Ross). 
 195. See, e.g., Willard v. Auto Underwriters, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 1192, 1193 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1980); Capps v. Klebs, 382 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). 
 196. Willard, 407 N.E.2d at 1193. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1193; Capps, 382 N.E.2d at 950. 
 199. See, e.g., Capps, 382 N.E.2d at 951-52. 
 200. See, e.g., Willard, 407 N.E.2d at 1193; Capps, 382 N.E.2d at 950. 
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The language used in the subrogation provision is also an important con-
sideration in determining whether a settlement with the tortfeasor constitutes 
complete compensation. In this context, where the provision provides for the 
right to be subrogated to all rights of recovery arising out of any claim or cause 
of action it establishes the insurer’s right to subrogation against the proceeds of 
a settlement.
201
 In addition to the language, however, the settlement must have 




Iowa law recognizes that an insurer cannot recover through subrogation 
unless or until its insured has been made whole.
203
 Application of the rule is 
made problematic however, by Iowa’s procedure for determining whether an 
insured has received complete compensation. For example, in Ludwig v. Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the court was asked to resolve whether an in-
sured who had settled her action against the third party had received full com-
pensation for purposes of the made whole doctrine.
204
 The insurer in Ludwig 
argued that when a settlement is made without the involvement of the company, 
the insured is presumed to be made whole.
205
 The insured, on the other hand, 
contended that because she had not received compensation for her pain and 
suffering in the settlement she had not been fully compensated.
206
 The subroga-
tion provision of the policy provided: 
Upon payment under part II of this policy [the “medical protection” 
provision] the Company shall be subrogated to the extent of such 
payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may re-
sult from the exercise of any rights of recovery which the injured 
person or anyone receiving such payment may have against any per-
son or organization and such person shall execute and deliver in-
struments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure 




Though the holding in Ludwig is consistent with the policy language, 
the court did not accord it any weight in its analysis. Rather, it relied on the 
  
 201. Mut. Hosp. Ins. Inc. v. MacGregor, 368 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1977). 
 202. Id. at 1381. 
 203. Ludwig v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Iowa 1986); 
Chickasaw County Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Weller, 68 N.W. 443, 444 (Iowa 
1896). 
 204. 393 N.W.2d 143, 144 (Iowa 1986). 
 205. Id. at 145. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 144. 
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fact that the insured’s medical expenses, lost wages, expense of hired help 
and car damage were established and each attributed specific dollar amounts 
in the settlement.
208
 Because the amount recovered from the third party could 
be attributed to separate and specific elements of damages, any money identi-
fied with covered losses which the insurer had paid for was subject to the 
latter’s subrogation claim, regardless of whether insured had been compen-
sated for all of its damages.
209
 According to the court, any other rule would 
make insurance companies indemnitors of losses not covered in the policy 
and operate as a windfall to the insured who had not paid for such cover-
age.
210
 While the settlement in Ludwig attributed a specific amount to medical 
expenses, the court noted that “[w]hen the amount attributed to the subro-





Kentucky courts have used the equitable nature of subrogation to sup-
port their adoption of the rule that, in the absence of a statute or valid contrac-
tual provision to the contrary, an insured must be fully compensated for 
losses sustained before the subrogation rights of an insurer arise.
212
 This rule 
contemplates that the common law made whole rule can be modified by stat-
ute or contract. In order for a statute to modify the rule, the statute must 
clearly express a preference for the insurer. The fact that a statute merely 
recognizes the carrier’s right of subrogation is insufficient.
213
 Application of 
this analysis has led courts to conclude that the made whole rule does not 
apply to statutory workers’ compensation claims.
214
  
The analysis for determining whether a contract alters the common law 
priority of right rule between the insurer and its insured is more complex. 
This complexity results from the fact that all agreements between the parties 
(i.e. policy language, releases, trust agreements, etc.) are relevant in determin-
ing whether the parties intended to modify the common law rule.
215
 In order 
to effectively shift the priority of right of the insured to the insurer, the lan-
guage must clearly and explicitly document the intent of the parties to: (1) 
provide the insurer with a right of subrogation; (2) permit that right to arise 
  
 208. Id. at 146. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 147. 
 211. Id. at 146 n.2. 
 212. Wine v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 917 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Ky. 1996). 
 213. Id. at 564. 
 214. AIK Selective Self Ins. Fund v. Bush, 74 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Ky. 2002). 
 215. See, e.g., Wine, 917 S.W.2d at 565. 
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immediately; and (3) subordinate the insured’s interest in further recovery to 




Conventional subrogation agreements are enforceable in Louisiana. 
However, the agreement does not change the priority of right of the insured to 
be made whole if the insurer’s payment constitutes only partial and not com-
plete compensation for the loss.
217
 Where the insurer’s payment constitutes 
partial satisfaction for the loss it becomes only partially subrogated to the 
insured’s claim.
218
 Consequently, the insured is entitled to seek compensation 
for the unpaid losses from the tortfeasor before the insurer can assert its sub-
rogation claim.
219
 In essence, the equitable made whole doctrine takes prece-
dence over the agreement between the parties. 
Maryland 
The law of Maryland recognizes a theoretical as well as practical dis-
tinction between legal, conventional and statutory subrogation. Conventional 
subrogation, to which the principles of equity is said to apply, requires proof 
that: (1) insured assigned its rights to the insurer; and (2) insurer paid the 
amount it was obligated by the policy to pay.
220
 Where these requirements are 




In Stancil v. Erie Insurance Co., the court entertained the issue of 
whether a conventional subrogation provision was enforceable when the in-
sured had not been made whole for its loss.
222
 The court concluded that equity 
did not require that the insured experience complete compensation where the 
condition precedents for conventional subrogation had been satisfied.
223
  
The approach adopted by the court in Stancil differs from that employed 
in jurisdictions which recognize that the parties can contractually modify the 
made whole rule. The Stancil approach does not require that the language of 
the contract “clearly, expressly or specifically” evidence an intent to preclude 
application of the made whole doctrine. Consequently, all that is required is 
an express agreement recognizing the right to subrogation and compliance 
therewith on the part of the parties.  
  
 216. Id. 
 217. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406 So. 2d 178, 179 (La. 1981). 
 218. Id. at 180. 
 219. Id. at 181. 
 220. Stancil v. Erie Ins. Co., 740 A.2d 46, 46-47 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1999). 
 221. Id. at 47. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 49-50. 
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It must be noted that the court in Stancil recognized a distinction be-
tween a property insurance policy, which was at issue in the case, and health 
insurance policies.
224
 This indemnity/personal insurance dichotomy may have 
influenced the court in determining the extent to which equitable principles 
such as the made whole rule should have application in the case sub judice. 
Michigan 
The made whole doctrine has been a part of Michigan insurance law 
since the case of Washtenaw Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Budd.
225
 The in-
sured’s priority of rights extends to complete compensation after deduction 
for attorney’s fees and costs.
226
 Consequently, the equation consists of adding 





Contractual subrogation provisions are valid and enforceable in Minne-
sota. These provisions attach to the proceeds of both settlements and judg-
ments. Nevertheless, even where the right to subrogation arises out of con-
tract it remains an offspring of equity.
228
 Thus, the terms of the subrogation 
will be governed by equitable principles, unless the agreement clearly and 
explicitly provides otherwise.
229
 Pursuant to this rule a subrogation clause 
does not ipso facto grant the right of first recovery to the insurer.
230
 Rather, it 
must first be determined whether the insured has been fully compensated and 
then whether the agreement “supersede[s] the general rules of equity by stat-
ing that [the insurer] is to be reimbursed even if its member recovers less than 
full compensation.”
231
 A literal reading of the latter part of the analysis seems 
to require the use of magic words, or at least words which unequivocally and 
clearly demonstrate the intent of the parties to preclude application of the 
made whole doctrine. Minnesota courts have also subjected the subrogation 





 224. Id. at 48. 
 225. 175 N.W. 231 (Mich. 1919). 
 226. Union Ins. Soc. v. Consol. Ice Co., 245 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Mich. 1932). 
 227. See id. 
 228. Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1983). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 3. 
 231. Id. at 704. See also MINN. STAT. § 62A.095 (1996) (prohibiting use of subro-
gation clause in health insurance plan unless clause provides that it applies only after 
covered person has been made whole). 
 232. See, e.g., Maday v. Yellow Taxi Co., 311 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn. 1981); 
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pagel, 439 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); 
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Mississippi 
In Hare v. State of Mississippi & Centra Benefit Services, Inc.,
233
 the 
Mississippi Supreme Court officially adopted the made whole rule of insur-
ance subrogation. In Hare, the policy contained a detailed and comprehensive 
subrogation provision.
234
 However, the court, after reviewing competing 
views from jurisdictions such as Ohio and Arkansas, concluded that distinc-
tions need not be made between equitable and conventional subrogation 
rights.
235
 Thus, in situations involving conventional subrogation, equitable 
principles and objectives are controlling.
236
 Thus, the insurer has priority of 
rights and is entitled to enforce its contractual right of subrogation only after 
the insurer has been fully compensated, or made whole.
237
 Under this ap-
proach the common law made whole rule is strictly applied and not subject to 




No Missouri court has expressly addressed the issue of priority of rights 
as between an insurer and its insured in the context of a conventional subro-
gation dispute. However, in Hayde v. Womach, the court in the context of the 
No Fault Act concluded that the dual objectives of subrogation precluded a no 





The 1977 Montana Supreme Court opinion in Skauge v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
240
 integrated the made whole doctrine into the 
insurance law of Montana. Skauge involved a property insurance policy con-
taining an expressed subrogation provision, which provided that the 
“[c]ompany may require from the insured an assignment of all right of recov-
  
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Galloway, 373 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. 1985); 
Pfeffer v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters Ins. Co., 292 N.W.2d 743, 744 (Minn. 
1980). 
 233. 733 So. 2d 277 (Miss. 1999). 
 234. Id. at 280. 
 235. Id. at 283. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 282. 
 238. See, e.g., Dunnam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 668, 672 
(Miss. 1979) (subjecting contractual subrogation provision to made whole rule in the 
context of uninsured motorist act). 
 239. 707 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 240. 565 P.2d 628 (Mont. 1977). 
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The parties agreed that the insured’s loss exceeded the policy limits and 
that the insured would not be made whole when this amount was added to the 
tort recovery.
242
 The Skauge court, after reviewing the objectives of subroga-
tion, adopted the rationale that: 
[w]hen the sum recovered by the Insured from the Tort-feasor is 
less than the total loss and thus either the Insured or the Insurer 
must to some extent go unpaid, the loss should be borne by the in-
surer for that is a risk the insured has paid it to assume.
243
 
This rationale was the foundation for the court’s adoption of the made 
whole rule.
244
 According to the rule, the insured is entitled to complete com-
pensation for the entire loss, including costs of recovery and attorney’s fees, 
before the insurer can assert its right to subrogation against either the insured 
or a third party.
245




The made whole rule as articulated by the court in Skauge is subject to 
exception. In Youngblood v. American States Insurance Co.,
247
 the court held 
that while subrogation, subject to the made whole rule, was allowable, medi-
cal payment subrogation provisions violated the public policy of the state and 
were consequently altogether invalid and unenforceable.
248
 
The Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed Skauge in 1994 in DeTienne 
Associates v. Farmers Union Mutual Insurance.
249
 As in Skauge, the court 
relied upon the dual objectives of subrogation to support its rejection of the 
insurer’s argument that its subrogation clause mandated that it be reimbursed 
for the money it had paid to the insured.
250
 The Skauge holding has also been 
extended to workers’ compensation claims.
251
 Thus, in Montana the princi-
ples of equity, not the blanket language of the contract or statute, dictate how 
subrogation rights are to be administered. 
  
 241. Id. at 630. 
 242. Id. at 629-30. 
 243. Id. at 632. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 632. 
 246. See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. McMillan, 31 P.3d 347, 350 (Mont. 
2001). 
 247. 866 P.2d 203 (Mont. 1993). See also Swanson v. Hartford Ins. Co., 46 P.3d 
584 (Mont. 2002). 
 248. Youngblood, 866 P.2d at 206. 
 249. 879 P.2d 704 (Mont. 1994). 
 250. Id. at 707-08. 
 251. See McMillan, 31 P.3d 347. 
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Nebraska 
In Shelter Insurance Cos. v. Frohlich,
252
 the Nebraska Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether a grant of a summary judgment motion to an 
insurer was proper where the insured had not been fully compensated for her 
loss.
253
 In resolving this issue, the court recognized that general subrogation 
clauses, while typically valid and enforceable, rarely define the precise nature 
and extent of an insurer’s subrogation interest or right.
254
 Consequently, the 
common law rule that subrogation is unavailable until the subrogor has been 
paid in full is applicable unless the contract provides for subrogation on pay-
ment of less than full recovery.
255
 In other words, “unless a contract provides 
otherwise, equitable principles apply even when a subrogation right is based 
on contract.”
256
 It is not enough that the contractual rights merely provide for 
or recognize the insurer’s right of subrogation.
257
  
Full compensation, in the absence of a contract or statutory provision to 
the contrary, is a prerequisite to subrogation.
258
 The rationale for this rule is 
that the insurance policy contains a basic promise to pay which should be 
subordinated to the insured’s right to complete compensation.
259
 Thus, if any-
one is to go unpaid it should be the insurer. Because the subrogation provi-
sion at issue in Frohlich was insufficient to modify the common law made 
whole rule, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
insurer and remanded the case back to the trial court for purposes of deter-
mining what amount would constitute full compensation of the insured.
260
 
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Dailey,
261
 the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska recommitted itself to the common law made whole rule by overrul-
ing Frohlich to the extent that it could be construed to permit conventional 
subrogation when the insured has not been fully compensated.
262
 In other 
words, the court in Blue Cross made it crystal clear that the parties may not 
contract out of the made whole rule. 
There is no precise formula for determining whether an insured has been 
made whole in Nebraska. The issue is generally treated as a question of fact. 
However, medical expenses and other damages suffered by the insured are to 
  
 252. 498 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 1993), overruled in part by Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
v. Dailey, 687 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 2004). 
 253. Id. at 79-80. 
 254. Id. at 78. 
 255. Id. at 78-79. 
 256. Id. at 79. 
 257. Id. at 79. 
 258. Id. at 78. 
 259. Id. at 82. 
 260. Id. at 82-83. 
 261. 687 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 2004). 
 262. Id. 
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 Factors affecting the enforceability of a subrogation right 
such as the tortfeasor’s ability to pay beyond the amount of the subrogor’s 
settlement and whether the settling parties have stipulated that the settlement 
satisfies all damages sustained by the insured are also relevant.
264
 Jury ver-
dicts, however, are presumptively conclusive of the amount that would com-




Subrogation is a creature of equity. As such, equitable principles apply 
even if the right of subrogation arises out of contract. Application of the prin-
ciples of equity, however, is subject to the rights of the parties to agree oth-
erwise. In order to displace equity B the right of the insured to be made whole 
before the insurer may assert its claim B the contract must be specific. Where 
the contract is general or where doubt exists “the interests of the insured 
come first.”
266
 As observed by the Court in Providence Washington Insur-
ance Co. v. Hogges:
267
  
In the absence of express terms in the contract to the contrary, [the 
insured] must be made or kept whole before the insurer may re-
cover anything from him or from a third party under its right of 
subrogation. Against the insured, as well as against third parties, 
there may be recovery by the insurer (again, subject to the express 
terms of the contract) ‘only if the cause is just and enforcement is 
consonant with reason and justice.’
268
 
In New Jersey equitable principles are used to guide an analysis of sub-
rogation disputes.
269
 In this context the relevant subrogation clause and 
agreements are to be evaluated.
270
 If the subrogation clause or contract is 
sufficiently specific to alter the common law made whole doctrine neither can 
be disregarded unless it fails to honor the reasonable expectation of the par-
  
 263. Frohlich, 498 N.W.2d at 82. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Bartunek v. Hormel, 513 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Neb. 1994); see also Pleon 
v. Union Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 436 (Neb. 1998) (holding statute providing that set-
tlement or judgment less than the policy limit of any applicable automobile liability 
insurance policy constitutes complete recovery of actual economic loss to be constitu-
tional). 
 266. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 171 A.2d 120, 124 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1971). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 124. 
 269. Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 559 A.2d 400, 404 (N.J. 1989). 
 270. Id. at 402. 
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ties, is unconscionable, and violative of public policy.
271
 Under this approach 
the issue of whether the insured has been made whole or fully compensated is 




In Winkelmann v. Excelsior Insurance Co.,
273
 the court recognized that 
when the insured’s actual loss exceeds the amount it has received from both 
the insurer and tortfeasor the insurer has no right to subrogation.
274
 The 
court’s analysis in Winkelmann, however, was “founded on the principles of 
equitable, not contractual, subrogation because [the insureds’] claims rest on 
equitable principles, not on rights or limitations arising from a release or as-
signment given [the insurer] by [the insured].”
275
 The made whole rule was 
extended to contractual subrogation in USF&G v. Maggiore.
276
 Therein, the 
court concluded that the burden of going uncompensated should rest with the 
party who assumed the risk and not on the inadequately compensated in-
sured.
277
 As the law currently stands the made whole rule and not the agree-
ment of the parties is dispositive of subrogation disputes. 
North Carolina 
In North Carolina the made whole doctrine mandates that when the total 
of the recovery by the insured from the tortfeasor and proceeds of the policy 
is less than total compensation and either the insured or insurer must go un-
paid, the loss should be borne by the insurer.
278
   
Ohio 
In Peterson v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Co.,
279
 the court considered a 
subrogation dispute which arose out of fire damage to the insured’s barn.
280
 
The insurance company, Ohio Farmers, paid the insured $7,814 on a real and 
personal property claim stipulated to be in excess of $17,629.
281
 The insureds, 
  
 271. Id. at 403. 
 272. Werner v. Latham, 752 A.2d 832, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
 273. 650 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995). 
 274. Id. at 843-44. 
 275. Id. at 843 n.*. 
 276. 749 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558-59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 277. Id. at 559. 
 278. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. W. P. Rose Supply Co., 198 S.E.2d 482, 
484 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973). 
 279. 191 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio 1963). 
 280. Id. at 157. 
 281. Id. 
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upon receipt of the proceeds, signed a proof-of-loss and executed the in-
surer’s standard subrogation receipt.
282
 Thereafter, both jointly filed a petition 
against the third party claiming that the insured’s loss was $17,629.56.
283
 A 
joint verdict in favor of both parties against the tortfeasor was subsequently 
returned in the amount of $11,514 and judgment was entered.
284
 
Thereafter, a dispute arose between the insured and insurer as to the di-
vision of the proceeds of the judgment.
285
 The court in Peterson determined 
that the key to resolving the dispute was to be found in the language of the 
subrogation provision of the policy and the subrogation receipt signed by the 
insured.
286
 According to the court the language providing that the insured 
“hereby subrogates said Insurance Company, to all of the rights, claims and 
interest which the undersigned may have” conveyed every bit of the insured’s 
rights of recovery up to $7,814.
287
 Therefore, the insurer being the owner of 
all the rights of the insured “must have priority in payment out of the funds 
recovered.”
288
 Ultimately the court concluded that an insurer who has cooper-
ated and assisted against the tortfeasor is entitled to be compensated first out 
of the proceeds of any recovery where the subrogation provision or receipt 




Three decades later, the Ohio Supreme Court revisited the issue of prior-
ity of rights in the context of health insurance in Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Mutual of Ohio v. Hrenko.
290
 The court reiterated its position that the disposi-
tive consideration was the language of the policy or subrogation receipts.
291
 
While the court found the language of the policy to be clear, unambiguous 
and enforceable, it was also influenced by the fact that the insured had re-
ceived the full benefits of his bargain.
292
 Consequently, the court concluded 
that pursuant to the terms of the policy, an insurer who has paid benefits to its 
insured and has been subrogated to the rights of its insured may enforce that 
right after the insured receives full compensation.
293
 In subsequent opinions 
involving health insurance subrogation disputes courts of appeals have con-
strued the relevant analysis to turn on an examination of the policy language 
and a consideration of whether the insured had been made whole. Whether 
the insured had received complete compensation however, ultimately was 
  
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 159. 
 287. Id. at 159. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 159-60. 
 290. 647 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio 1995). 
 291. Id. at 1360. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
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The court explained the critical nature of the requirement that the in-
sured be made whole before the insurer can assert its subrogation right in 
Central Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Hartzell.
295
 In Central Reserve, the 
court of appeals went further than any court before and declared that any at-
tempt by the insurer to claim priority over a partially compensated insured via 
a subrogation clause was “unenforceable and contrary to public policy.”
296
 
Thus, the court concluded that it is contrary to the public policy of Ohio to 
allow an insurer to contractually establish priority over an insured’s claim 
before the latter has been made whole.
297
 
The accuracy of the conclusion that whether the insured has been made 
whole is dispositive of who has priority of rights in a subrogation dispute was 
called into question by the court of appeals in Northern Buckeye Education 
Council Group Health Benefits Plan v. Lawson.
298
 There, the court enter-
tained a subrogation dispute arising out of the payment of medical ex-
penses.
299
 The insured in Lawson argued that pursuant to the made whole 
doctrine the insurer was not entitled to reimbursement until she had received 
full compensation.
300
 The insurer argued that pursuant to the plan, specifically 
the terms of the Reimbursement and Subrogation Agreement which insured 
signed, it was entitled to full reimbursement regardless of whether the insured 
had been made whole.
301
 
The court in Lawson, purporting to balance the principles of freedom of 
contract and equity, concluded that “unless the terms of a subrogation agree-
ment clearly and unambiguously provide otherwise, a health insurer’s subro-
gation interests will not be given priority where doing so will result in less 
than a full recovery to the insured.”
302
 This conclusion constituted a break 





 294. See, e.g., Huron County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Saunders, 775 N.E.2d 892, 897 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Grine v. Payne, No. WD-00-044, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1342, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Cent. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hartzell, No. 
94AP120094, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 6027, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
 295. 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 6027, at *7. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. 798 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), aff’d, 814 N.E.2d 1210 (Ohio 2004). 
 299. Id. at 668-69. 
 300. Id. at 669. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 673. 
 303. Id. at 673-74. 
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Oklahoma 
In Equity Fire & Casualty Co. v. Youngblood,
304
 the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma addressed the enforceability of subrogation and reimbursement 
provisions in health insurance policies for the first time. The court questioned 
whether “a contractual subrogation or reimbursement provision, which con-
tain[ed] no priority of payment provision, [was] enforceable under Oklahoma 
law where the recipient of the benefits sought to be recovered has not been 
fully compensated by payments from a third party.”
305
 While the policy in 
dispute was governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), the court nevertheless concluded in the negative.
306
 It held that an 
insurer could not share in the settlement proceeds because: (1) the plan did 
not expressly delineate a priority for payment of such monies; (2) the plan’s 
managers were not expressly vested with authority to bind plan members with 
their interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the plan; and (3) the proceeds 
paid to the insured failed to fully compensate her for her damages.
307
 
Oklahoma courts have extended the rationale and holding of 
Youngblood to subrogation disputes arising out of insurance policies not gov-
erned by ERISA. For example, in American Medical Security v. Josephson,
308
 
the court of appeals applied the three part holding of Youngblood to a subro-
gation dispute arising out of a health insurance policy not governed by 
ERISA. The Josephson court also held that a settlement did not presump-
tively constitute complete compensation or make a party whole.
309
 Rather, 
whether a party has been made whole by proceeds from a settlement with a 
torfeasor clearly presents a question of fact.
310
  
Statutory subrogation is viewed entirely different from contractual sub-





In Pennsylvania, an insurer’s subrogation rights are not superior to the 
rights of an insured because subrogation does not arise until the insured has 
been made whole.
312
 This rule of law has been consistently applied by lower 
  
 304. 927 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1996). 
 305. Id. at 574. 
 306. Id. at 576. 
 307. Id. at 576-77. 
 308. 15 P.3d 976 (Okla. Ct. App. 2000). 
 309. Id. at 979. 
 310. Id. 
 311. See Tomlinson v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 77 P.3d 628, 632 (Okla. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding make whole rule not applicable to workers’ compensation act). 
 312. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DiTomo, 478 A.2d 1381, 1383 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1984). 
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state courts to both equitable and contractual subrogation disputes between 
insurers and their insureds.
313
 The made whole doctrine is also applicable to 
statutory subrogation disputes in the absence of a legislative intent to displace 
the rule.
314
 In determining the subrogation rights of the insurer, most courts 
limit the recovery from the insured to the amount by which the sum received 
by the insured from the tortfeasor, together with the insurance payments 
made, exceeds the loss and expense incurred by the insured in realizing the 
claim against the wrongdoer.
315
 Pursuant to this measure, the expenses of 
making the recovery from the wrongdoer, including attorneys’ fees, must be 
taken into account in determining whether the insured has any excess recov-
ery to which the insurer would be entitled under the doctrine of subroga-
tion.
316
 However, there is authority for the proposition that when the insured 
settles with the tortfeasor the settlement conclusively establishes the settle-




In Lombardi v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island concluded that the right of subrogation did not arise until the 
insured had received full compensation.
318
 Lombardi, however, was subse-
quently distinguished by the lower state court in Ditomasso v. Ocean State 
Physicians Health Plan, Inc.
319
 Therein the court found an unambiguous sub-
rogation provision which displaced the made whole rule enforceable. Accord-
ing to the court in Ditomasso: 
Lombardi is inapplicable to and distinguishable from the case at 
bar. First, Lombardi addressed the issue of subrogation rights as 
applicable to general liability insurers. Here, the defendant is a 
health insurer. Second, the Court in Lombardi held that the defen-
dant insurance companies subrogation rights did not arise until the 
plaintiffs had received full satisfaction of the judgment against the 
uninsured. Plaintiff in the instant matter has not received a judg-
  
 313. See, e.g., Gallop v. Rose, 616 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 314. See, e.g., id. at 1031; City of Meadville v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 
A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). 
 315. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 627, 630 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1983). 
 316. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kintz, 27 Pa. D. & C.3d 164 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1983); see also Associated Hosp. Serv. v. Pustilnik, 439 A.2d 1149, 1151-52 (Pa. 
1981). 
 317. See, e.g., Butler, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d at 632. 
 318. 429 A.2d 1290, 1292 (R.I. 1981). 
 319. No. 87-2467, 1988 R.I. Super. LEXIS 52, at *5-6 (May 5, 1988). 
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ment from any court but rather has been paid $ 25,000 (the policy 




In South Dakota the made whole doctrine is a default rule subject to the 
right of the parties to agree otherwise.
321
 The agreement need not be specific 
or use the magical phrase “made whole.”
322
 Rather, the South Dakota Su-
preme Court has adopted a plain meaning approach to reach the conclusion 
that general subrogation language is sufficient to displace the doctrine.
323
 
Under this approach the absence of language in the policy or statute that lim-
its the right of subrogation to instances where the insured has been made 




In Wimberly v. American Casualty Co., the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
announced that an insurer could not assert a subrogation claim until the in-
sured has been made whole.
325
 The Wimberly court rejected the argument that 
the equitable nature of subrogation could be modified by the terms of a con-
tract.
326
 According to the court the distinction between legal and conventional 
subrogation is only dispositive of “whether there is a right of subrogation in 
the first instance, rather than in the enforcement of such right.”
327
 While an 
insurer can not contractually modify the common law made whole rule, a 
failure on the part of the insured to obtain contractually required permission 
of the insurer to a settlement preserves the latter’s subrogation rights even if 
the insured is not made whole.
328
 Thus, where the insurer does not participate 
in the settlement negotiations between its insured and the tortfeasor or does 
not waive its rights the subrogation claim must be honored and the made 
  
 320. Id. 
 321. Westfield Ins. Co., Inc. v. Rowe, 631 N.W.2d 175, 180 (S.D. 2001); Julson 
v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 117, 121 (S.D. 1997). 
 322. Rowe, 631 N.W.2d at 180; Julson, 562 N.W.2d at 121. 
 323. Rowe, 631 N.W.2d at 180; Julson, 562 N.W.2d at 121. 
 324. Rowe, 631 N.W.2d at 180; Julson, 562 N.W.2d at 121. 
 325. 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. (quoting Castleman Contr. Co. v. Pennington, 432 S.W.2d 669, 675 
(Tenn. 1968). 
 328. Eastwood v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 646 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tenn. 1983); Rader 
v. Traylor, No. 03A01-9403-CV-00079, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 418, at *4-5 (Aug. 
1, 1994). 
File: Parker Created on:  10/9/2005 4:57 PM Last Printed: 10/16/2005 4:24 PM 
766 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70  
 
whole doctrine is inapplicable.
329
 This exception to the made whole rule is 
subject however, to a further caveat which provides that if the parties agree 
that the insured has not been made whole or the underlying facts make clear 




Tennessee’s law of subrogation is quite simple despite its seeming com-
plexity. The common law made whole rule governs in both legal and conven-
tional subrogation or reimbursement disputes between insurers and their in-
sureds.
331
 Thus, where the issue of whether the insured has been fully com-
pensated is raised at the trial level the insurer’s subrogation claim is stayed 
until this issue is resolved.  
Tennessee recognizes two analytical frameworks for assessing the sub-
rogation rights of insurers in the context of statutory subrogation disputes. 
The primary objective of the court under both frameworks is to identify and 
give effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature.
332
 Under one analysis, 
if the statute merely creates a subrogation right without embracing or aban-
doning the made whole rule the court is prone to conclude that the legislature 
“intended for the statute to reflect the equitable principle that subrogation is 
subject to the made whole doctrine.”
333
 The analytical framework is premised 
on the notion “that subrogation is founded upon principles of equity and ‘not 
dependent upon statute or custom or . . . contract.’”
334
  
The second analytical framework is applicable where the statute pro-
vides the insurer with a statutory lien. Pursuant to this analysis, a statutory 





The made whole doctrine is firmly entrenched in Texas’ law of insur-
ance subrogation. However, the rules pertaining to the doctrine are distin-
guishable on the basis of legal and contractual subrogation. In the context of 
legal or equitable subrogation, “[a]n insurer is not entitled to subrogation if 
  
 329. Eastwood, 646 S.W.2d at 158; Doss v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., No. 
M2000-01971-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906, at *10-11 (Dec. 10, 
2001). 
 330. Doss, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906, at 12-13. 
 331. Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Gifford, 108 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tenn. 2003); 
York v. Sevier County Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tenn. 1999); Wimberly 
v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979). 
 332. Blankenship v. Estate of Joshua, 5 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tenn. 1999); See, e.g., 
Castleman v. Ross Eng’g, Inc., 958 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tenn. 1997); Graves v. Cocke 
County, 24 S.W.3d 285, 289 (Tenn. 2000). 
 333. Blankenship, 5 S.W.3d at 651. 
 334. Id. (citing Wimberly, 584 S.W.2d at 203). 
 335. See, e.g., Castleman, 958 S.W.2d at 724; Graves, 24 S.W.3d at 289. 
File: Parker Created on: 10/9/2005 4:57 PM Last Printed: 10/16/2005 4:24 PM 
2005] MADE WHOLE DOCTRINE 767 
 
the insured’s loss is in excess of the amounts recovered from the insurer and 
the third party causing the loss.”
336
 Reasonable expenses in making the re-
covery, including attorneys’ fees, are included in the calculation of the in-
sured’s total loss.
337
 In determining whether the insured has been made whole 
only that portion of the recovery attributable to the insured loss is relevant.
338
 
Thus, an insurer, after a deduction of its share of the cost of collection, is 
entitled to subrogation to the extent that the total of insurance collected plus 
the amount recovered from the tortfeasor for the insured’s losses exceeds the 
amount of the total insured loss.
339
  
In Esparza v. Scott & White Health Plan,
340
 the court of appeals ad-
dressed the issue of whether a contractual agreement providing for the right 
of subrogation completely removes the issue of subrogation from the realm of 
equity. According to the court, “[w]hile an insurance contract providing ex-
pressly for subrogation may remove from the realm of equity the question of 
whether the insurer has a right to subrogation, it cannot answer the question 




In essence, express subrogation provisions “confirm but [do] not ex-
pand, the equitable subrogation rights of insurers. To avoid injustice, the eq-
uities must still be balanced in deciding what amount, if any, the subrogee is 
entitled to receive in a given case.”
342
  
Pursuant to the balancing of the equities analysis, which is applicable to 
contractual subrogation disputes, the made whole rule is not absolute.
343
 Con-
sequently, the court may consider not only whether the insured has been 
made whole, but also whether (1) the insured acted to circumvent or com-
promise the subrogee’s interest, and (2) the subrogee failed to protect its own 
interest by waiting until a settlement had been achieved in determining the 
equities of the case.
344
 The equation for determining whether the insured has 
been made whole however, is the same as that used in legal subrogation dis-
putes.  
Statutory subrogation disputes, in the absence of a specific statutory 
definition, are subjected to a plain meaning of the words of the statute ap-
proach. Where a statute merely employs the term “subrogation” the court is 
prone to conclude that “the Legislature did not, and did not intend to, confer 
  
 336. Ortiz v. Great S. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex. 1980). 
 337. Id. at 344. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. 909 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App. 1995). 
 341. Id. at 551 (emphasis omitted). 
 342. Id. at 552 (citations and quotation omitted). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 533 (applying balancing of the equities analysis allowed insurer one 
half of its subrogation claim). 
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any greater right to subrogation than would be found in the exercise of an 




The Utah Supreme Court adopted the equitable made whole rule in Hill 
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.
346
 The court in Hill recognized that 
the doctrine could be modified by contract.
347
 However, the modification, in 
order to effectively displace the doctrine, must be sufficiently clear and un-
ambiguous as to put the insured on notice of that fact.
348
 General subrogation 
language is insufficient to explicitly inform an insured that its insurer has 
priority of rights even though the assets of the third party are inadequate to 
fully compensate the former.
349
  
The made whole doctrine’s application to statutory subrogation disputes 
depends upon the court’s determination of the legislative intent and purpose 
of the statute. Equitable principles are to be employed in determining how the 
right is to be exercised where the statute merely grants the insurance carrier 
the right to subrogation.
350
 However, if the statute provides a detailed statu-
tory scheme governing how an insurer’s subrogation right may be exercised 
and how the proceeds from an action against the third party are to be distrib-




In Thiringer v. American Motors Insurance Co.,
352
 the Washington Su-
preme Court applied the equitable made whole rule to determine the priori-
ties, as between an insured and its insurer, in the proceeds of a settlement 
between the insured and the responsible third party.
353
 The policy in question 
in Thiringer reserved to the insurer a right of subrogation and provided that 
the insured should do nothing to prejudice such right.
354
 The Supreme Court 
agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that in the context of a general settle-
ment involving automobile personal injury protection the proceeds should be 
first applied toward the payment of the insured’s general damages and then, if 
  
 345. Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., Inc. v. Ward, 18 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. App. 2000). 
 346. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). 
 347. Id. at 866. 
 348. See, e.g., State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 105 (Utah 2003). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 96 P.3d 903, 907 (Utah 2004). 
 351. Id. 
 352. 588 P.2d 191 (Wash. 1978).  
 353. Compare id. at 194, with Cook v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 1154 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that Thiringer does not apply when there is no third party 
tortfeasor liable to the insured). 
 354. Thiringer, 588 P.2d at 216. 
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any excess remains, toward the payment of the special damages covered by 
personal injury protection insurance.
355
 Thus, the insured is entitled to recover 
its general damages before subrogation is allowed.
356
  
The made whole doctrine presupposes that an insurer is entitled to reim-
bursement for payments made to the extent that the insured recovers from a 
responsible third party. However, it can only recover the excess the insured 
receives from the third party after the insured has been fully compensated for 
its loss. According to Washington’s law, reimbursement disputes are to be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis upon a consideration of “the equitable fac-
tors involved, guided by the principle that a party suffering compensable in-




The factors used to determine the equitable resolution of a subrogation 
or reimbursement dispute between an insurer and its insured where the in-
sured executes a general release with the tortfeasor include: (1) the knowl-
edge of insureds and tortfeasors as to outstanding subrogation claims; (2) the 
extent of the prejudice to insurer’s subrogation interests; (3) the desirability 
of encouraging settlements; (4) the possibility of sharp practices by tortfea-
sors, insureds or their insurance carriers; and (5) the general public policy that 
persons suffering compensable injuries are entitled to be made whole.
358
 
“Where the equities are evenly balanced, the principle that persons suffering 




While the insured is entitled to recoup his general damages from the 
tortfeasor before subrogation is permitted, in doing so it may not do anything 
to prejudice the rights of the insurer.
360
 As explained by the court of appeals 
in British Columbia Ministry of Health v. Homewood:
361
 
[T]o establish prejudice [the insurer] must show (1) the percentage 
of negligence of [each of three tortfeasors]; (2) the total losses the 
plaintiff suffered; [and] (3) that the settlement as a percentage of 
plaintiff’s total injuries was less than the percentage of the settling 
entities’ comparative negligence. Only if the latter percentage ex-
  
 355. Id. at 195; see also B.C. Ministry of Health v. Homewood, 970 P.2d 381, 386 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that general settlement involving health insurance 
should be apportioned first to general damages and then any excess to special dam-
ages). 
 356. Homewood, 970 P.2d at 385 n.5. 
 357. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Torres, 779 P.2d 722, 723 (Wash. 1989) (quoting 
Thiringer, 588 P.2d at 194) (applying the same principle to a subrogation dispute). 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 725. 
 360. See, e.g., Homewood, 970 P.2d at 386. 
 361. 970 P.2d 381. 
File: Parker Created on:  10/9/2005 4:57 PM Last Printed: 10/16/2005 4:24 PM 
770 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70  
 
ceeds the former will [the insurer’s] subrogation rights have been 
prejudiced . . . .
362
 
The holding in Thiringer was construed by the court of appeals in Fisher 
v. Aldi Tire, Inc. to allow the parties to the contract to modify subrogation 
standards developed at common law.
363
 However, the language purporting to 




The made whole rule was first incorporated into West Viriginia’s law of 
insurance subrogation in 1991.
365
 In Kittle v. Icard
366
 the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the West Virginia 
Department of Human Services (DHS) was entitled to be fully reimbursed for 
medical expenses paid on behalf of an insured from the amount the insured 
received in settlement from a tortfeasor.
367
 DHS argued that the trial court 
erred when it applied the common law made whole rule instead of West Vir-
ginia Code Section 9-5-11 (1990).
368
 According to DHS, the statute abrogated 
common law equitable principles.
369
 
The Supreme Court in Kittle agreed that the West Virginia statute was 
applicable.
370
 However, the court was not persuaded that the use of the term 
“subrogation” in the statute altered its common law meaning.
371
 According to 
the court, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent requiring 
otherwise, the term subrogation is to be given its usual and ordinary mean-
ing.
372
 Thus, the use of the term “subrogation” in a statute merely grants the 
insurer a right of subrogation.
373
 The extent to which that right may be exer-




 362. Id. at 387 (quoting Elovich v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 1319, 1327 
(Wash. 1985)). 
 363. 902 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
 364. Id. 
 365. Kittle v. Icard, 405 S.E.2d 456, 464 (W. Va. 1991). 
 366. 405 S.E.2d 456. 
 367. Id. at 464. 
 368. Id. at 459. 
 369. Id. at 460. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id.; but see Grayam v. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 498 S.E.2d 12, 16 
(W. Va. 1997) (construing amended statute to preclude application of made whole 
rule); Cart v. Gen. Elec. Co., 506 S.E.2d 96, 99 (W. Va. 1998) (construing workers’ 
compensation statute to abrogate common law made whole rule). 
 373. Id. at 461. 
 374. Id. at 461-62. 
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Despite the fact that Kittle was subsequently statutorily superceded, 
courts continue to apply its rationale and holding in all forms of subrogation 
dispute.
375
 Thus, in the absence of clear statutory law or valid contractual 
arrangements to the contrary, an insured must be made whole for losses sus-
tained before the subrogation rights of the insurer can be exercised.
376
 Gen-
eral subrogation language does not defeat application of the complete com-
pensation rule.
377
 Only contractual arrangements which clearly and expressly 
create an agreement to the contrary have such an effect.
378
 
“[T]he right of subrogation depends upon the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case.”
379
 In determining the application of the made whole 
rule the court is to be guided by the rationale that the made whole doctrines 
embodies a socially desirable policy and that if anyone is to go uncompen-
sated it should be the insurer.
380
 The court should also consider, among other 
factors, the following: (1) the ability of parties to prove liability; (2) the com-
parative fault of all parties involved in accident; (3) the complexity of the 
legal and medical issues; (4) future medical expenses; (5) nature of injuries; 





Wisconsin decisional law has done more to influence the expansion of 
the made whole doctrine than that of any other jurisdiction.
382
 In two deci-
sions, Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance Co.
383
 and Rimes v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,
384
 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the 
importance of equitable principles in the context of insurance subrogation. In 
Garrity, the issue before the court was “when an insured’s loss exceeds the 
amount recoverable under a standard fire insurance policy written in confor-
mity with [WIS. STAT. § 203.01 (1969)], what are the respective rights of the 
insured and the subrogated insurer to the damages recovered from the tort-
  
 375. Kanawha Valley Radiologists v. One Valley Bank, N.A., 557 S.E.2d 277, 
282 (W. Va. 2001). 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Kittle, 405 S.E.2d at 463. 
 380. See id.; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 483 S.E.2d 819, 825 
(W. Va. 1997). 
 381. Bennett, 483 S.E.2d at 825. 
 382. The cases most cited in support of the made whole doctrine – Garrity v. Ru-
ral Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.W.2d 512 (Wis. 1977) and Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1982) – are both Wisconsin opinions. 
 383. 253 N.W.2d 512. 
 384. 316 N.W.2d 348. 
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feasor who caused the loss?”
385
 In resolving this issue, the court reasoned that 
under common law subrogation principles a partially subrogated insured is a 
competitor with the insurer and that “where either the insurer or the insured 
must to some extent go unpaid, the loss should be borne by the insurer for 
that is a risk the insured has paid it to assume.”
386
 Consequently, under basic 
principles of subrogation, whether the subrogation is “legal” or “conven-
tional,” the insurer is not entitled to recoup anything until the insured has 
been made whole.
387
 The court in Garrity further concluded that the subroga-
tion clause in the policy did not change the substantive common law rule 
because the contract contained no language to the contrary.
388
 
In Rimes, the issue was stated as: 
[W]hether an automobile insurer . . . which, under a subrogation 
agreement signed by its insured . . . has made payment under the 
medical-pay provisions of its policy, has the right to recover those 
payments out of the monies received by its insured in a settlement 
with negligent third-party tortfeasors and their liability insurers, 
when . . . the settlement figure was less than the total damages sus-
tained by the insured . . . .
389
 
Rather than analyzing the text of the subrogation agreement, the court 
relied on the principles of Garrity to support its conclusion that “the contrac-
tual terms of subrogation agreements in an insurance policy were to be ap-
plied according to the rules of equity.”
390
 Thus, the principles of equity and 
not the contract language control even where the language of the agreement 
unambiguously states that the insurer’s subrogation rights are superior to the 
insured’s right to be made whole.
391
  
The made whole rule is not absolute. It may be altered by statute. Cer-
tain circumstances such as where the settlement will allow the tortfeasor to 
escape liability all together or where an insured and tortfeasor settle without 
involving the subrogated insurer and without submitting the issue of the sub-
rogated insurer’s rights to the court, requires that the court balance the equi-
ties between the insured and insurer in determining the right and extent of 
subrogation.
392
 Nevertheless, where the situation ultimately boils down to a 
  
 385. Garrity, 253 N.W.2d at 512. 
 386. Id. at 514. 
 387. Id. at 514-515. 
 388. Id. at 516. 
 389. 316 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Wis. 1982). 
 390. Id. at 353. 
 391. See Ruckel v. Gassner, 646 N.W.2d 11, 12-13 (Wis. 2002). 
 392. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 411 
N.W.2d 133, 135 (Wis. 1987), overruled by Schulte v. Frazin, 500 N.W.2d 305 (Wis. 
1993); Mut. Serv. Cas. Co. v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 410 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Wis. 
1987); Vogt v. Schroeder, 393 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Wis. 1986). 
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competition between subrogated insurer and its insured who has not been 
made whole and (1) the insured settles with the tortfeasor without resolving 
the subrogated insurer’s part of the claim; (2) settling parties request a Rimes 
hearing; and (3) the subrogated insurer had an opportunity to participate in 
the hearing the subrogated insurer’s rights of subrogation depend on whether 
the settlement made the insured whole.
393
 
In Wisconsin, a settlement is not dispositive of whether an insured has 
been made whole.
394
 Rather, the court, in the context of the subrogation dis-
pute, must conduct an evidentiary hearing on this matter. In the context of 
this hearing, the court should focus on what loss the plaintiff had actually 




As originally conceived the made whole doctrine applied to subrogation, 
whether legal or conventional. Consequently, even where the insurer had paid 
all of the policy proceeds and included an expressed subrogation provision in 
the policy, the right to subrogation was stayed until the insured received 
complete compensation. Many states however, have adopted a modified made 
whole doctrine. According to these states, since the doctrine is of equitable 
origins and conventional subrogation is grounded upon a legal contract the 
parties are free to agree that the made whole doctrine is not applicable. How-
ever, in order to contract out of the equitable principle the agreement must 
satisfy certain requirements. At a minimum, to be effective the agreement 
must clearly and explicitly reflect the intentions of the parties that the equita-
ble doctrine is not applicable. In essence the doctrine in these jurisdictions is 
a default rule applicable to conventional subrogation unless modified by an 
agreement otherwise. In the absence of an agreement precluding the applica-
tion of the doctrine, the insured is entitled to be made whole before the in-
surer may recover any portion of its payments.  
The following classifications of the doctrine turn upon the extent to 
which it can be modified by agreement. However, it should be noted that the 
doctrine can be classified according to the equation used by courts to assess 
whether the insured has been made whole. Classification along this line 
would render two subclasses; one in which courts consider the expenses, in-
cluding attorney fees, incurred by insured in making the recovery from the 
  
 393. Shulte, 500 N.W.2d at 310-11. 
 394. See Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 355 (Wis. 
1982). 
 395. Compare Ives v. Coopertools, 559 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Wis. 1997) (plurality 
decision), with Sorge v. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 512 N.W.2d 505, 507-09 (Wis. 
1994). 
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A. Common Law Equitable Made Whole Doctrine 
At common law, subrogation, whether legal or conventional, was to be 
governed by equitable principles. Subrogation agreements merely recognized 
the right of an insurer to be subrogated. The agreement neither expanded nor 
determined the extent to which the right of subrogation could be exercised. 
These issues were to be resolved exclusively on the basis of equity. Jurisdic-
tions which follow the view that the made whole doctrine cannot be contrac-
tually modified include Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. 
B. Made Whole Doctrine Subject to Contractual Modification 
At least fourteen jurisdictions have adopted the view that parties are free 
to agree that the made whole rule is inapplicable. These jurisdictions employ 
different standards regarding how specific the language used to defeat appli-
  
 396. Whether attorney fees are to be considered in the equation for determining 
made whole is extremely important because 14 of the 34 jurisdictions which recog-
nize the made whole doctrine also follow the common fund doctrine (Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin). Pursuant to 
the latter doctrine, if subrogation is allowed, an insurer who fails to participate in the 
process of making the recovery is obligated to pay the insured’s attorney a pro rata 
share of the cost of his services in creating the fund. Alabama, which recognizes both 
doctrines, does not consider attorney fees in determining made whole but does allow 
for the recovery of attorney fees from the insurer if subrogation is allowed. Other 
jurisdictions such as Michigan, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Texas recognize both that 
attorney fees and expenses incurred in making the recovery from the tortfeasor are to 
be considered in determining whether the insured has been made whole and in the 
event the insurer is allowed subrogation the an insurer, under circumstance supporting 
the application of the common fund doctrine is responsible for a pro rata share of the 
insured attorney fees incurred in creating the fund. See supra respective section for 
each jurisdiction on made whole. See also Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 
So. 2d 772, 781 (Ala. 1990); CNA Ins. Cos. v. Johnson, 639 So. 2d 355 (Ala. 1994) 
(common fund); Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Waters, 337 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1983) (common fund); Mont. W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 38 P.3d 
825, 828 (Mt. 2002) (common fund); Cataldi v. Methodist Hosp. & Coordinated 
Health Servs., 747 A.2d 1239, 1241 (Pa. Super. Cr. 2000) (common fund); Lancer 
Corp. v. Murillo, 909 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. App. 1996) (common fund). For a de-
tailed discussion of the common fund doctrine, see Johnny Parker, The Common Fund 
Doctrine: Coming of Age in the Law of Insurance Subrogation, 31 IND. LAW REV. 313 
(1998). 
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cation of equity must be. Consequently, these jurisdictions fall into four sub-
classifications. The first sub-classification consists of jurisdictions which 
recognize that general subrogation language is sufficient to prevent the appli-
cation of the full recovery rule. Jurisdictions that follow this view include 
Illinois, South Dakota, and Maryland. The second subclass requires that the 
agreement contain clear, explicit and/or specific language. Jurisdictions that 
fall within this group include: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia. The third sub-
classification requires not only clear and specific language but also that the 
insurer actively participates in the recovery process. California is the only 
jurisdiction to adhere to this view. The last subclass requires that the agree-
ment, in order to be effective, use magical or unequivocal words. This view is 
followed in Minnesota. 
C. Made Whole Doctrine Subject to a Balancing of the Equities 
Three jurisdictions, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia, engage in a 
balancing of the equities analysis in determining the application of the made 
whole doctrine in a contractual subrogation dispute between an insurer and its 
insured. In the analysis, the facts and circumstances of the case, conduct of 
the parties, contractual language and the general public policy that the insured 
should be made whole are considered in determining the extent to which the 
doctrine applies. As a rule, in the absence of opprobrious conduct on the part 
of the insured, where the equities are evenly balanced or where there is seri-
ous doubt, the made whole doctrine should be accorded greater weight in the 
analysis and the equities should be balanced in favor of complete compensa-
tion for the insured.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The made whole doctrine has received much judicial and scholarly at-
tention. Judges and commentators however, have avoided delving into the 
intricacies of the doctrine. Consequently, the principle is discussed and ex-
plained as if it were a single rule subject to a single exception. The reality is 
that the made whole or complete compensation rule is a complex equitable 
principle designed to achieve fairness between the parties to a subrogation 
dispute. As demonstrated by its multiple forms, fairness does not always re-
quire that one or the other group (i.e. insurers or insureds) of disputing parties 
always prevail. Rather, as demonstrated by the state-by-state survey, the rule 
can be the subject of as many requirements as deemed necessary in order to 
effectuate perfect justice. A comprehensive understanding of the doctrine 
simplifies this task and allows the court to rearrange the boundaries so that 
the reasonable expectation of the parties and the public are reflected in both 
the equation and the result. 
 
